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INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND COMMUNITY METHOD INTHE
IMPLEMENTATION OF EU LEGISLATION FOLLOWINGTHE
LISBONTREATY
MERIJN CHAMON*
Abstract
On paper, the LisbonTreaty radically changed the way in which EU law is
implemented by defining a new institutional balance in Articles 290 and
291 TFEU, bringing decision-making in this area more in line with the
traditional Community method. However, the real reform brought by the
Lisbon Treaty depends on how the political institutions and the Courts
interpret and apply the new Treaty rules. An analysis of seven years of
post-Lisbon institutional practice and case law shows that in reality
the institutions have largely undone Lisbon’s reform, meaning that the
post-Lisbon institutional balance in this area largely resembles
the pre-Lisbon one and that decision-making in this area fails to align with
the Community method ideal type.
1. Introduction
In 2007, the EU Member States agreed on reforming the EU through the
Treaty of Lisbon. One area which saw a fundamental reform was that of the
implementation of EU law which had hitherto been governed by Articles 202
and 211 EC. The new Articles 290 and 291 TFEU laid down a new
institutional balance for executive rule-making. Any discussion at the time
could only result in preliminary conclusions, since a lot would depend on how
the new rules would be applied by the political institutions and interpreted by
the Court of Justice.1 Over the past few months, the EU Courts have delivered
* Post-doctoral assistant at the Ghent European Law Institute, Ghent University (Jean
Monnet Centre of Excellence); Visiting Professor at the University of Antwerp. I would like to
thank the reviewers for their very useful comments and suggestions. Any errors or omissions
remain mine.
1. Kröll, “Delegierte Rechtsetzung und Durchführungsrechtsetzung und das institutionelle
Gleichgewicht der Europäischen Union”, 66 ZöR (2011), 253–298, at 298; Ritleng, “La
délégation du pouvoir législatif de l’union européenne”, in Cohen-Jonathan, Constantinesco,
Michel, Piris and Wachsman (Eds.), Chemins d’Europe: Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean Paul
Jacqué (Dalloz, 2010), p. 576.
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a number of judgments in this area while the institutions have adopted a new
Common Understanding on delegated acts, allowing for a first general
assessment of the actual reform brought by the Lisbon Treaty.
More specifically, this article focuses on the following issues: (i) the notion
of essential elements, which is key to distinguishing legislative acts from
non-legislative acts; (ii) the non-delegation doctrine in Article 290 TFEU,
which sets the limits to the Commission’s power to adopt delegated acts;
(iii) the relation between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU or the question when a
non-legislative act should be adopted as either a delegated act or as an
implementing act; and (iv) executive rule-making outside Articles 290 and
291 TFEU, or the question whether non-legislative binding acts can only be
adopted in the form of either a delegated or an implementing act. These issues
are of fundamental importance because they determine how EU law may be
applied and what the horizontal (inter-institutional) and vertical (EU-Member
states) power relations are in this field.
In order not to lose sight of the bigger picture, these issues will be discussed
from a more general constitutional perspective, further illustrating the
relationship between two rather elusive concepts in EU constitutional law:
institutional balance and the Community method. The resulting analysis helps
understand the Lisbon Treaty’s true repercussions for EU executive
rule-making and shows that despite the Lisbon Treaty’s radical re-definition
of the institutional balance in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the Court’s
post-Lisbon case law results in an institutional balance resembling the
pre-Lisbon institutional balance. Together with the political institutions’
practice this means that the framework for executive rule-making in the EU
has not been fundamentally altered.
2. The institutional balance and the Community method
The institutional balance is a principle often referred to but generally
ill-understood, and depending on how it is conceived also of little practical
use.2 In line with Smulders and Eisele it is understood here as a legal concept
2. This is especially so if it the institutional balance is seen as exogenous to the Treaties. See
Lenaerts and Verhoeven, “Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for democracy in EU
Governance”, in Joerges and Dehousse (Eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated
Market (OUP, 2002), p. 47; Michel, Institutionelles Gleichtgewicht und EU-Agenturen
(Duncker & Humblot, 2015), p. 91. For a more developed critique, see Chamon, EU Agencies:
Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration (OUP, 2016),
pp. 268–70. Similarly, if the institutional balance is a way of referring to how the EU institutions
actually function, its legal value is also null.
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“according to which the EU institutions have to act within the limits of their
respective powers as provided for by the Treaty.”3
Still, in order to have any use as a legal principle, institutional balance
should be more than the idea that the institutions have to respect the limits to
their powers,4 which in itself already follows from Article 13(2) TEU. The
limits, procedures and conditions referred to in that Article are not always
clear, however, in which case a principle of institutional balance which is
“created by the Treaties”5 would allow them to be deduced from the
constitutional charter through legal reasoning. This way, the gaps left by the
explicit Treaty provisions may be filled,6 even if the Court so far seems
reluctant to employ the principle as such.7
The question in casu then is which institutional balance is laid down in
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU,8 and whether these Articles leave certain issues
unaddressed, allowing the Court to interpret these provisions in light of the
institutional balance enshrined in those Articles. The present
conceptualization of the institutional balance further shows how final
3. Smulders and Eisele, “Reflections on the Institutional Balance, the Community Method
and the Interplay between Jurisdictions after Lisbon”, 31 YEL (2012), 112–117, at 114.
Lenaerts and Verhoeven break down the legal principle in three sub-rules; see Lenaerts and
Verhoeven, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 44–45.
4. Chalmers has criticized the Court for not treating the institutional balance as a principle.
See Chalmers, “Justifying institutional accommodation”, 33 EL Rev. (2008), 455–456, at 456.
See also Chamon, “The Institutional Balance, an ill-fated principle of EU law?”, 21 EPL
(2015), 371–392.
5. Case C-70/88, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:1990:217, para 21.
6. Chamon, op. cit. supra note 4, at 385; Le Bot, Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel en
droit de l’union européenne (Université Panthéon-Assas, 2012), PhD Thesis, p. 259; Prechal,
“Institutional balance: A fragile principle with uncertain contents”, in Heukels, Blokker and
Brus (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam (Kluwer Law International, 1998),
pp. 277–278.
7. See Chamon, op. cit. supra note 4, at 382–383; Le Bot, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 298. The
MFA case is illustrative in this regard. While the case lend itself perfectly to the application of
an institutional balance test it was solved differently. See Case C-409/13, Council v.
Commission, EU:C:2015:217. For a discussion see Chamon, “Upholding the ‘Community
method’: Limits to the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative proposals”, 40 EL Rev.
(2015), 895–909, at 907–908.
8. Understanding the institutional balance as not exogenous to the Treaties shows the
difficulty in the argument made by Blumann in relation to the Lisbon Treaty: “En matière
d’exécution, la séparation des pouvoirs, . . . connaît une montée en puissance au détriment du
principe d’équilibre institutionnel.” See Blumann, “Le système normatif de l’Union
européenne vingt ans après le traité de Maastricht”, (2012) R.A.E.-L.E.A., 235–258, at 256
(own emphasis).
Implementation of legislation 1503
conclusions on the actual institutional balance can only be drawn once the
Court has interpreted those Articles.9
The Community method is not defined in the Treaties or any official
document but it is generally juxtaposed with the intergovernmental method
and, recently, the Union method,10 and is often used to describe the EU’s
unique legislative process.11 However, an institutional balance perspective
shows that such a conceptualization is too restrictive. Indeed, if it is a genuine
method, it potentially characterizes several of the different institutional
balances laid down in the Treaties and not just those in the legislative sphere.
The Community method then uniquely distinguishes the EU both from
other international organizations12 and from (federal) States in a number of
ways: Member States are directly involved at the federal level, decisions,
including binding decisions, may be taken by majority, a unique independent
body safeguards the general interest,13 the citizens of the supranational polity
are directly represented at the international level in a parliamentary assembly
with proper decision-making powers, and the political process is subjected to
the compulsory jurisdiction of a court of law.14 As a result, in both the creation
9. This also follows from the declaration theory adopted by the ECJ in Denkavit, see Case
61/79, Denkavit, EU:C:1980:100. See also Schütze, European constitutional law (Cambridge
University Press, 2012), p. 300.
10. The Union method proposed by Chancellor Merkel in 2010 was generally rejected as
mere political discourse. See Sarrazin and Kindler, “‘Brügge sehen und sterben’ –
Gemeinschaftsmethode versus Unionsmethode”, 35 Integration (2012), 213–222; Ponzano,
“Community and intergovernmental method: an irrelevant debate?”, 23 Notre Europe Policy
Brief (2011), 1–4. Recently however, Eijsbouts and Reestman have made a case to take it
seriously: see Eijsbouts and Reestman, “Editorial: In search of the Union Method”, 11 EuConst.
(2015), 425–433.Yet, their embryonic argument does not really convince as it requires non-EU
instruments to be recognized as EU law and to accept the Member States as the highest EU
authority. Trying to counter the idea that there cannot be any authority outside the law, they
stress that in the EU legal order (stricto sensu) there already are different procedures to adopt
primary and secondary legislation (a question in reality distinct from that on the Rechtsstaat).
The Union method proposed then seems to boil down to the complete supremacy of the Member
States and a methodology characterized by “politics trumps law”.
11. See e.g. Kranz, “Gibt es ein Demokratiedefizit in der Europäischen Union?”, 51 Arch.
VR (2013), 403–425, at 411; Gatto, “Governance in the European Union: A legal perspective”,
12 CJEL (2006), 488–516, at 491; von Bogdandy, Arndt and Bast, “Legal instruments in
European Union law and their reform: A systematic approach on an empirical basis”, 23 YEL
(2004), 91–136, at 124.
12. See Devuyst, “The European Union’s institutional balance after the Treaty of Lisbon:
‘Community method’ and ‘democratic deficit’ reassessed”, 39 GJIL (2008), 247–326, at 251.
13. Dehousse, “The ‘Community method’ at sixty”, in Dehousse (Ed.), The “Community
Method” – Obstinate or Obsolete? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 5.
14. Le Bot, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 41.
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and application of the law, the EU legal order is much more advanced, or
State-like, than the decentralized and primitive international legal order.15
The Community method allows for effective action at the international
level16 and is not simply meant to protect the smaller Member States.17 Rather,
it allows the reconciliation of different interests,18 whereby decision-making
results in the adoption of binding acts, subject to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice. Understanding the Community method in this way
allows it to be traced also beyond the legislative sphere, in areas such as
executive rule-making, external relations, etc. In casu, this begs the question
of whether the new institutional balance laid down in Article 290 and 291
TFEU is a move towards or away from the Community method ideal type.
3. Pre- and post-Lisbon comitology from the perspective of the
institutional balance and the Community method
3.1. The pre-Lisbon development of comitology
Applying both concepts helps in understanding comitology’s development
since the 1960s.19 In the EU’s system of executive federalism,20 the Member
States are primarily responsible for implementing EU law, the exception
being direct administration, i.e. EU institutions implementing EU law.
Before the Single European Act (SEA), the latter exception largely rested on
the legal basis of Article 155 EEC which provided that “the Commission
15. See Kelsen, Principles of International Law (Rhinehart, 1952), p. 22. See further
Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, International Law and International Relations (Cambridge
University Press, 2007), pp. 12–13.
16. Dehousse, op. cit. supra note 13, p. 8.
17. See e.g. Pech, “The institutional development of the EU post-Lisbon: A case of plus ça
change…?”, in Ashiagbor, Countouris and Lianos (Eds.), The European Union after the Treaty
of Lisbon (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 15. Similarly, Temple Lang, “Checks and
balances in the European Union: The institutional structure and the ‘Community Method’”, 12
EPL (2006), 127–154, at 134–136.
18. Dehousse, op. cit. supra note 13, pp. 6–7. See also COM(2001)428, at 8.
19. For a historical discussion of comitology, see Demmke, Eberharter, Schaefer and Türk,
“The history of comitology”, in Pedler and Schaefer (Eds.), Shaping European Law and Policy
(EIPA, 1996), pp. 61–82. See also Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers in the
European Union and the Committee System (OUP, 2006).
20. Lenaerts, “A new institutional equilibrium? In search of the ‘trias politica’ in the
European Community”, in Engel and Wessels (Eds.), From Luxembourg to Maastricht:
Institutional Change in the European Community after the Single European Act (Europa
Union, 1992), pp. 142–143.
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shall . . . exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter.”
The institutional balance resulting from this provision was clear: the
Commission could be empowered by the Council. In political terms this was
rather unbalanced since the Council had unfettered discretion in its choice of
conferring (or not) powers on the Commission. Its discretion also had vertical
repercussions, since Article 155 EC did not impose any requirements before
Member States could be divested of their prerogative to implement EU law. It
is from this field of tension that the comitology-experiment grew: the
Commission was empowered to implement European law but it was assisted
(or controlled) in this by committees composed of national civil servants.
From a Community method perspective, comitology was partially
laudable, since the Member states have a legitimate interest in the
implementation of EU law, even if this was not recognized by the institutional
balance defined in Article 155 EEC. Still, given the Council’s discretion and
the resulting weak position of the Commission, comitology was far from
completely in line with the Community method and instead was a variation
thereon. This was not because of “the introduction of implementation
committees into the decision-making process”,21 since these committees
precisely allowed the legitimate interests of the national administrations to be
taken into account, but because of the preponderance of intergovernmental
over supranational decision-making.
The subsequent Treaty modifications then brought a further alignment of
the institutional balance to the general Community method, by strengthening
the position of the Commission (SEA,22 Lisbon Treaty) and by recognizing
the legitimate role of the Parliament (Lisbon Treaty).23 While the Lisbon
Treaty has been criticized in general for marginalizing the Community
method,24 this does not seem to be the case for Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
21. Scott and Trubek, “Mind the Gap: Law and new approaches to governance in the
European Union”, 8 ELJ (2002), 1–18, at 3.
22. See Glaesner, “The Single European Act: Attempt at an appraisal”, 10 Fordham
International Law Journal (1987), 446–502, at 469; Blumann, “Le pouvoir exécutif de la
commission à la lumière de l’Acte unique européen”, 24 RTDE (1988), 23–60, at 30–32. For a
more mixed evaluation, see Institut d’Études Européennes,L’ActeUnique Européen—Journée
d’Études, Bruxelles 1er mars 1986 (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1986), pp. 22–25.
23. The reform of the second comitology decision in 2006 already strengthened
Parliament’s position, see Schusterschitz and Kotz, “The Comitology Reform of 2006:
Increasing the powers of the European Parliament without changing the Treaties”, 3 EuConst
(2007), 68–90; Szapiro, “Comitologie: Rétrospective et prospective après la réforme de 2006”,
(2006) Revue du droit de l’Union européenne, 545–586.
24. This because of a weakening of the Commission and the further recognition of the
European Council. See Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 17; Devuyst, op. cit. supra note 12.
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3.2. The post-Lisbon framework
The Lisbon Treaty introduced the new Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, resulting
in a new institutional balance that is much more in keeping with the
Community method.25
Article 290 TFEU Article 291 TFEU
1. A legislative act may delegate to the
Commission the power to adopt
non-legislative acts of general
application to supplement or amend
certain non-essential elements of the
legislative act.
The objectives, content, scope and
duration of the delegation of power
shall be explicitly defined in the
legislative acts. The essential elements
of an area shall be reserved for the
legislative act and accordingly shall not
be the subject of a delegation of power.
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay
down the conditions to which the
delegation is subject; these conditions
may be as follows:
(a) the European Parliament or the
Council may decide to revoke the
delegation;
(b) the delegated act may enter into
force only if no objection has been
expressed by the European
Parliament or the Council within a
period set by the legislative act.
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the
European Parliament shall act by a
majority of its component members,
and the Council by a qualified majority.
3. The adjective “delegated” shall be
inserted in the title of delegated acts.
1. Member States shall adopt all
measures of national law necessary to
implement legally binding Union acts.
2. Where uniform conditions for
implementing legally binding Union
acts are needed, those acts shall confer
implementing powers on the
Commission, or, in duly justified
specific cases and in the cases provided
for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty
on European Union, on the Council.
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the
European Parliament and the Council,
acting by means of regulations in
accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure, shall lay down in advance
the rules and general principles
concerning mechanisms for control by
Member States of the Commission’s
exercise of implementing powers.
4. The word “implementing” shall be
inserted in the title of implementing
acts.
25. Hofmann, “Legislation, delegation and implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon:
Typology meets reality”, 15 ELJ (2009), 482–505, at 504; Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 572.
However, Barents saw a weakening of the Commission, see Barents,Het Verdrag van Lissabon,
Achtergronden en commentaar (Kluwer, 2008), pp. 461–462.
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Summarizing briefly,26 the Lisbon Treaty introduced a distinction between
the modification of formal legislative acts (through executive acts) and the
genuine, or pure, implementation of legislation.27 The commingling of the
two pre-Lisbon was an anomaly since the Commission performs a different
function when it implements (in the strict sense) or when it changes (formal)
legislation. The former is normally done by the Member States, the latter by
the EU legislature, meaning different interests are affected when the
Commission exercises the one or the other function. The distinction between
the two has therefore meant that the (new) institutional balance in this area
reflects more properly the Community method: only the Member States are
involved when the Commission acts under Article 291 TFEU, only the
legislature when the Commission acts under Article 290 TFEU.
In addition, Article 291(2) TFEU now also qualifies the scenario in which
recourse should be made to the exception of direct administration. This
“objectification”28 opens the possibility for the Court to enforce Article
291(2) TFEU. The second paragraph also rightly identifies the Commission as
the default EU authority to adopt implementing acts, upping the threshold
before the Council may be empowered.
The 2011 Comitology Regulation29 respected the new institutional balance
in the sense that it purged the Council’s involvement in comitology. The
Regulation did leave intact the old regulatory procedure with scrutiny (the
so-called PRAC)30 which largely covers the field of the delegated act under
Article 290 TFEU. The process of updating all existing references in
26. For a more extensive discussion, see e.g. Bergström and Ritleng (Eds.), Rulemaking by
the European Commission (OUP, 2016), p. 280; Bast, “New categories of acts after the Lisbon
Reform: Dynamics of parliamentarization in EU law”, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 885–927, at
908–919.
27. De Witte, “Legal instruments and law-making in the Lisbon Treaty”, in Griller and
Ziller (Eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty
(Springer, 2008), p. 99.
28. See Kröll, op. cit. supra note 1, at 283; Blumann, “Un nouveau départ pour la
Comitologie. Le règlement no 182/2011 du 16 février 2011”, 47 CDE (2011), 23–52, at 26.
Differently, Schütze noted that the legislature is free to delegate under Art. 291 TFEU, but that
the Commission can only act if the Member States fail in implementing EU legislation in a
sufficiently uniform manner. See Schütze, “‘Delegated’ legislation in the (new) European
Union: A constitutional analysis”, 74 MLR (2011), 661–693, at 691. In light of this Dubos
observes that the legislature will have to justify its choice to empower the Commission under
Art. 291 TFEU. See Dubos, “Objectif d’efficacité de l’exécution du droit de l’union
européenne: La tectonique des compétences”, in Neframi (Ed.),Objectifs et compétences dans
l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2012), p. 297.
29. Regulation (EU) 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. 2011, L
55/13.
30. The PRAC was introduced in 2006 as an alternative to the delegated act foreseen by the
(failed) Constitutional Treaty. See supra note 3.
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legislation to the PRAC should have been concluded by the end of the 7th
parliamentary term in 2014 but is still ongoing.31
The preliminary conclusion based on the new provisions in primary and
secondary legislation would find that the Commission succeeded in
undermining the (old) comitology system,32 but still begs the question of how
the institutional practice, especially the Court’s case law, has evolved
post-Lisbon.
4. The Courts’ interpretation ofArticles 290 and 291 TFEU
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Christiansen and Dobbels
rightly warned that the new Treaty provisions did not conclude the reform
process.33 Indeed, following the negotiations on the new Treaty, the
infra-constitutional rules (e.g. the Comitology Regulation and possible
inter-institutional agreements) must be adopted; finally there are the
negotiations on each legislative proposal in which the constitutional and
infra-constitutional rules are applied. Since the Comitology Regulation has
already formed the subject of several commentaries,34 the following sections
will focus immediately on the Court’s case law in relation to some of the
contentious issues left open by the Lisbon Treaty. Most often these were
inter-institutional conflicts whereby every institution involved requested the
Court to confirm its own reading of the Treaties.35 While there are many
31. For a discussion, see Chamon, “Dealing with a zombie in EU law: The regulatory
comitology procedure with scrutiny”, 23 MJ (2016), 721–723.
32. See the question raised by Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics and treaty reform
(OUP, 2010), p. 56–57.
33. Christiansen and Dobbels, “Comitology and delegated acts after Lisbon: How the
European Parliament lost the implementation game”, 16 European Integration Online Papers
(2012) <eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-013a.htm>, p. 8.
34. Xhaferri, “Delegated acts, implementing acts, and institutional balance implications
post-Lisbon”, 20 MJ (2013), 557–575, at 566–70; Chamon, “Comitologie onder het Verdrag
van Lissabon”, 61 SEW (2013), 63–75; Blumann, op. cit. supra note 28; Craig, “Delegated acts,
implementing acts and the new Comitology Regulation”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), 671–687; Daiber,
“EU-Durchführungsrechtsetzung nach Inkrafttreten der neuen Komitologie-Verordnung”, 47
EuR (2012), 240–253.
35. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission adopted a
Communication and internal guidelines on the issue; the Parliament adopted two Resolutions in
2010 and 2014; the Council Legal Service adopted an opinion; and in 2011 a Common
Understanding on delegated acts was adopted by the three institutions (now replaced with a
new Common Understanding, cf. infra). See COM(2009)673; SEC(2011)855; Resolution of
the European Parliament of 5 May 2010 on the power of legislative delegation, O.J. 2011, C
81E/6; European Parliament resolution of 25 Feb. 2014 on follow-up on the delegation of
legislative powers and control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing
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issues left open (or even raised) by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU,36 the present
contribution will focus on those which the Court has already clarified (to
some extent). These issues relate to (i) the demarcation line between
legislation and non-legislative acts, (ii) the non-delegation doctrine in Article
290 TFEU, (iii) the demarcation line between delegated and implementing
acts and (iv) executive rule-making outside Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
4.1. The demarcation line between legislative and non-legislative acts
Pre-Lisbon, the Court had drawn the line between legislative acts and
implementing (in the broad, pre-Lisbon, sense) acts according to the notion of
“essential elements”. According to the Court in Köster, the Treaty
“establish[ed] a distinction . . . between the measures directly based on the
Treaty itself and derived law intended to ensure their implementation. It
cannot therefore be a requirement that all the details . . . be drawn up by the
Council according to [the legislative procedure]. It is sufficient . . . that the
basic elements of the matter to be dealt with have been adopted in accordance
with [that] procedure.”37 In Germany v. Commission the Court further
clarified that the essential provisions are those “which are intended to give
concrete shape to the fundamental guidelines of Community policy.”38 The
Commission therefore held discretionary or wide powers whenever it
implemented legislation, although the Commission did not enjoy the same
discretion in every policy field.39
On this issue, the Lisbon Treaty was significant because it codified Köster
in primary law, albeit not fully since it is not codified in Article 291 TFEU, the
provision concerning implementing acts.40 In light of the observations above,
the codification in 290 TFEU provides the Court with a new reference point
allowing it to elaborate its jurisprudence, subjecting the political process to
abstract legal principles. The legislature therefore minimally has to decide on
the essential elements itself.41 Similarly, the Commission must be able to
powers; Council Legal Service, Application of Arts. 290 (delegated acts) and 291
(implementing acts) TFEU, 11 Apr. 2011, 8970/11.
36. See e.g. Stancanelli, “Le système décisionnel de l’Union”, in Amato, Bribosia and de
Witte (Eds.), Genèse et destinée de la constitution européenne (Bruylant, 2007), p. 525.
37. Case 25/70, Köster, EU:C:1970:115, para 6.
38. Case C-240/90, Germany v. Commission, EU:C:1992:408, para 37.
39. See Case 22/88, Vreugdenhil BV, EU:C:1989:277, para 17.
40. This itself is not an omission, but simply a result of the different functions of the
delegated and implementing act. Still, some authors do find the silence on the substantive limits
to the Commission’s powers under Art. 291 TFEU (compared to Art. 290 TFEU) problematic,
see infra note 35.
41. Whether the legislature should therefore also limit itself to deciding on the essential
elements is unclear. The final report of the Convention’s Working Group on Simplification
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identify the essential elements of any basic legislative act which it is called
upon to amend or supplement. Can a general rule be devised allowing for the
identification of these essential elements? Bergström faults the Treaty authors
for not addressing this “grey zone”,42 but it seems doubtful whether it would
be feasible and appropriate to deal with this question in a constitutional
charter. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Court had the
opportunity to give some further guidance on a number of occasions.
4.1.1. The essential elements are those subject to political choices
The Schengen Borders Code case was the first such opportunity.43 Under the
PRAC, the Council, in its executive capacity, had adopted a decision
supplementing the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).The rules and guidelines in
question applied to rescue operations during border surveillance missions
coordinated by Frontex. The Parliament challenged the decision, arguing that
it dealt with issues that did not come under the SBC and that the decision
therefore went beyond the amendment of the SBC’s non-essential elements.
The Court in its ruling explicitly clarified that identifying the essential
elements is not for the legislature alone to decide, but instead “must be based
on objective factors amenable to judicial review.”44
The Court found that the essential elements are those that are the subject of
political choices. As a result, the Council in the contested decision was not
allowed to add elements which require political choices to be made. The ECJ
then proceeded by juxtaposing the content of the contested decision with its
legal basis (Art. 12 of the SBC). The latter deals with border surveillance,
defining its main purpose as “[preventing] unauthorized border crossings,
[countering] cross-border criminality and [taking] measures against persons
who have crossed the border illegally.”45 Article 12 itself being very succinct,
it does not “contain any rules concerning the measures which border guards
are authorized to apply against persons or ships when they are apprehended”46
states that the introduction of the delegated act could encourage the legislature to do so. See
European Convention, CONV 424/02, p. 9. In this sense also Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 1,
pp. 570–571; Stancanelli, op. cit. supra note 36, p. 523.
42. Bergström, op. cit. supra note 19, p. 359.
43. Case C-355/10, Parliament v. Council (Schengen Borders Code), EU:C:2012:516. The
case itself did not deal with a delegated act but with an act adopted pursuant to the PRAC (a
precursor to the delegated act). A.G. Mengozzi noted the consensus on the relevance of the case
for the current Art. 290 TFEU. See Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Case C-355/10, Parliament v.
Council, EU:C:2012:207, para 29 at footnote 32.
44. Case C-355/10, Parliament v. Council, para 67.
45. See Art. 12 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, O.J. 2006, L 105/1.
46. Case C-355/10, Parliament v. Council, para 73.
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but its fifth paragraph does allow “additional measures governing border
surveillance” to be adopted via the PRAC.
Given this framework, could the contested decision on the rules for search
and rescue operations be qualified as “measures governing surveillance that
are additional to the provisions of Article 12 SBC”?The Court thought not, for
two connected reasons: firstly there was no clear reference point in the SBC
for the contested implementing measures,47 secondly defining the
enforcement powers of border guards is an issue of political significance given
its potential impact on human rights (of migrants) and the sovereign rights of
third States.
4.1.2. No areas a priori reserved to the legislature
Does this mean that issues such as human or third States’ rights are always
reserved to the legislature? This is what Parliament aimed to argue in the
Europol case,48 when it challenged the Council’s decision extending the list of
third States with which Europol can conclude agreements for data
transmission.49 The Council’s decision was based on Article 26(1)a of the
(pre-Lisbon) Europol decision,50 which allowed the Council to implement the
Europol decision. The Parliament argued inter alia that the list was an
essential element of the basic Europol decision, since it was “liable to have
serious consequences for the fundamental rights of citizens”;51 but the Court
was not convinced, since the possibility of data transmission was taken up in
the basic legislative act itself and because inclusion on the list does not mean
that the transmission of personal data to that country is immediately enabled:
for this, a further agreement between Europol and the third country concerned
was required.52 The Court also noted that Europol’s external relations are only
(?) ancillary to its core activities and that the Europol decision itself laid down
the possibility of developing such relations and their objectives as well as their
framework.53 The political choices were therefore contained in the legislative
act setting up Europol.
47. In this respect, the SBC case is similar to pre-Lisbon Philippines Border Securitywhere
the Court accepted that security is a pre-condition for development but ruled that the
Commission’s decision fell outside the scope of the basic regulation since the latter did not
contain express provisions on the matter. See Case C-403/05, Parliament v. Commission,
EU:C:2007:624, para 59.
48. Case C-363/14, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2015:579.
49. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2014/269, O.J. 2014, 138/104.
50. See Decision (JHA) 2009/371 of the Council, O.J. 2009, L 121/37.
51. Case C-363/14, Parliament v. Council, para 52.
52. Ibid., paras. 53–55.
53. Case C-363/14, Parliament v. Council, paras. 49–50.
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4.1.3. It’s the legislative framework, stupid!
That it is the framework defined in the basic legislative act itself that firstly
determines whether a secondary measure touches on the essential elements or
not may also be seen in the Czech Republic v. Commission and Multiannual
cod plan cases.
Czech Republic v. Commission54 concerned the legality of two delegated
regulations55 supplementing the Directive on Intelligent Transport Systems
(ITS).56 The Directive creates a framework for the Member States to deploy
ITS, the aim of which is to allow maximal efficient use of road infrastructure.
The two contested delegated regulations prescribed inter alia that Member
States ought to designate independent national bodies to monitor private
parties’ compliance.
According to the Czech Republic, this requirement had no basis in the
legislative act – the Directive – since they could not be qualified as
specifications under Article 6 of the Directive (which the Commission was
entitled to adopt). As a result, the requirement to designate independent
national bodies supplemented or amended an essential element of the
Directive. However, the General Court stressed that the specifications could
relate to the entirety of the Directive and not just to its Article 6.57 In this
regard, the General Court noted that Article 4, point 17 of the Directive
provides that a specification “means a binding measure laying down
provisions containing requirements, procedures or any other relevant rules”
(own emphasis), while Article 6 provided “organizational provisions that
describe the procedural obligations of the various stakeholders” and stated
that the “specifications shall, as appropriate, provide for conformity
assessment.” Before stressing these provisions in the basic legislative act, the
General Court had also noted, that the Commission had been granted a
discretionary power, since “les compétences de la Commission au titre d’une
délégation se distinguent des compétences d’exécution, notamment en ce qui
concerne la marge d’appréciation dont elle dispose.”58 In light of this, the
General Court found that the vague reference points in the Directive were not
problematic; after all, the Commission had a margin of appreciation in
54. Joined Cases T-659 & 660/13, Czech Republic v. Commission, EU:T:2015:771.
55. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 885/2013, O.J. 2013, L 247/1; Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 886/2013, O.J. 2013, L 247/6.
56. Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the framework
for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for
interfaces with other modes of transport, O.J. 2010, L 207/1.
57. See Joined Cases T-659 & 660/13, Czech Republic v. Commission, para 58.
58. Ibid., para 47.
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considering whether those requirements were necessary for the achievement
and effective enforcement of the Directive.59
In theMultiannual cod plan cases,60 the Council, in its executive capacity,
had amended the Regulation establishing the multiannual plan for cod
stocks.61 The Council had thereby made use of Article 43(3) TFEU which
allows it to “adopt measures on fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative
limitations and on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities.” The
Commission and Parliament argued that the contested decision ought to be
adopted as a legislative act pursuant to Article 43(2) TFEU.
Both institutions argued that Article 43(2) TFEU was the default provision
to be relied upon, whereas Article 43(3) TFEU could only be used to adopt sui
generis implementing measures fixing (inter alia) the total allowable catches
(TACs) and the fishing opportunities.62 However, the contested regulation laid
down the methodology to fix these TACs and opportunities and a possibility
to derogate from the default rules (laid down in the basic legislative
regulation). According to the Council, this was not problematic since the two
Treaty provisions exist autonomously from each other and because Article
43(3) TFEU allows measures on the fixing of TACs and opportunities, not just
measures fixing those TACs and opportunities.63
While the controversy raised many interesting issues, the ECJ decided it
rather straightforwardly by applying its finding in the Venezuela case which
had been ruled a couple of months previously.64 In Venezuela, the Court had
already clarified the relationship between paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 43
TFEU,65 finding that Article 43(2) TFEU allows policy choices to be made,
whereby the legislature has to assess the necessity of the proposed measures
for the attainment of the CFP’s objectives.66 Article 43(3) TFEU however
does not require such an assessment, since the measures adopted on that basis
“are of a primarily technical nature and are intended to be taken in order to
implement provisions adopted on the basis of Article 43(2).”67 The question to
resolve in Multiannual cod plan then was whether the Council had made
policy choices or whether the contested regulation merely constituted
measures of a technical nature. The Court concluded that the Council had
59. Ibid., paras. 63–65.
60. Joined cases C-124 & 125/13,Parliament andCommission v.Council, EU:C:2015:790.
61. Council Regulation (EU) 1243/2012, O.J. 2012, L 352/10.
62. Joined Cases C-124 & 125/13, Parliament and Commission v. Council, paras. 33–34.
63. Ibid., paras. 40–41.
64. Joined Cases C-103 & 165/12, Parliament and Commission v. Council, EU:C:2014:
2400.
65. A very recent case in which this issue was also put to the Court is Case C-113/14,
Germany v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2016:635.
66. Joined Cases C-103 & 165/12, Parliament and Commission v. Council, para 48.
67. Ibid., para 50.
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“appreciably altered”68 the rules for determining the TACs and that it had also
“substantially amended”69 the rules for determining the fishing opportunities.
While the new rules did not affect the objectives of the basic legislative act,70
the Court noted that the amendments “define the legal framework in which
fishing opportunities are established and allocated. They thus result from a
policy choice having a long-term impact on the multiannual recovery plan for
cod stocks.”71 As a result, the contested regulation had been adopted on the
wrong legal basis.
4.1.4. Identifying the essential elements and the resulting institutional
balance
How have the Courts clarified the demarcation line and what institutional
balance results from this case law? Firstly the Court relied on a petitio
principii: the essential elements are the elements which are the subject of
political decisions. This begs the question: which decisions are political? To
which the answer probably is: those deciding the essential elements. However,
what matters most, at least for practitioners, is whether the Court’s ruling is
workable and from this perspective the Court has perhaps comes close to the
most workable abstract principle, appealing to our understanding that there
are political and a-political (or at least “less political”) issues, without clearly
distinguishing between the two.
It further follows from SBC and Europol (see above) that there are no fixed
areas that are (a-)political.72 Instead, in each area policy has to be set by the
legislature and may then be worked out by means of non-legislative acts. In
this regard not too much importance should be attached to the fact that the
Court in SBC and Europol reserved the political choices to the legislature,
while inMultiannual cod plan (and Venezuela) it spoke of policy decisions.73
What is important, also from the perspective of institutional balance, is that
68. Joined Cases C-124 & 125/13, Parliament and Commission v. Council, para 73.
69. Ibid., para 75.
70. Ibid., para 77.
71. Ibid., para 80. It is not clear here whether the fact that provisions in the contested
decision allowed the Council not to apply an annual adjustment of the TAC (or fishing effort)
was a deciding factor. The Court’s language (in para 76) does not seem to affirm this, but those
provisions perfectly illustrate how the Council fundamentally revised the legislative regulation.
72. Interpreting the SBC case completely differently on this point, see Voermans, Hartmann
and Kaeding, “The quest for legitimacy in EU secondary legislation”, 2 Theory and Practice of
Legislation (2014), 5–32, at 23.
73. The difference appears purely semantic in light of other language versions. In French,
German and Italian there is no distinction between policy and political choices. In Dutch a
distinction may be made, but the Dutch version of the Multiannual cod plan (and Venezuela)
cases refers to political choices (like in SBC and Europol), not to policy choices (like the
English version does).
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the Court has reserved to itself the competence to draw the demarcation line.74
The Court could have left this in the hands of the legislature,75 but instead
subjected this to judicial review, analogously to the choice for a legal basis.
Equally importantly, the Court in the Multi-annual cod plan cases
confirmed that the distinction between essential and non-essential elements is
also relevant where the Council exercises a sui generis implementing power
(derived directly from the Treaties). Bergström noted that such implementing
acts “will not have to be confined to non-essential elements and,
therefore, . . . these non-legislative acts could and most likely will have the
same substantive quality as legislative acts.”76 In this regard, it should be
stressed that the Court actually read Article 43(2) and (3) TFEU together
instead of autonomously as suggested by the Council.77 However, not every
sui generis implementing power of the Council can be linked to a provision
conferring powers on the EU legislature in the way Article 43(3) TFEU can be
linked to Article 43(2) TFEU. While this is for instance the case for Articles
78(3) and 95(3) TFEU (to be read together with Arts. 78(2) and 91(1) TFEU),
the sui generis implementing provisions of inter alia Articles 42(a), 74 and
109 TFEU appear genuinely self-standing.
Distinguishing the essential from the non-essential requires an analysis of
both the measures in question and their context. In this respect a fairly
coherent test emerges from the case law. The Court thus checks the content of
the contested measures in the light of the relevant provision of the legislative
act, and that provision is in turn situated in the general context of the
legislative act. The odd case seems to be Joined Cases T-659 & 660/13, Czech
Republic v. Commission, in which the framework for the delegated acts of the
Commission was only scantly worked out in the legislative act. Here the
General Court relied on the wide discretion afforded to the Commission when
it adopts delegated acts as opposed to when it adopts implementing acts, but
this was later overruled by the Court in Connecting Europe Facility (see
below).
In terms of institutional balance it is worth stressing again that the ECJ
reserved to itself the power to draw the line between essential and
non-essential elements. Further, looking at the Court’s actual scrutiny, it
cannot really be said that it defers to the viewpoint of the legislature. Of
course, it is largely the legislature determining the context, but the Court still
goes quite a long way in ascertaining the objective factors allowing the
74. Stressing this, see Xhaferri, op. cit. supra note 34, at 564.
75. Making a suggestion to this end, see Voermans, “Delegeren is een kwestie van
vertrouwen”, 25 RegelMaat (2010), 165–181, at 174. Similarly, see Ritleng, op. cit. supra note
1, p. 574.
76. Bergström, op. cit. supra note 19, pp. 353–354.
77. See Joined Cases C-124 & 125/13, Parliament and Commission v. Council, para 58.
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identification of the essential elements. The picture which emerges from the
Courts’ case law may be juxtaposed with the positions taken by the EU
institutions following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In this respect
it need not come as a surprise that the Council’s Legal Service and the
Parliament had stressed the primary responsibility of the legislature in
identifying the essential elements.78 For equally evident reasons, the
Commission noted that it did “not intend to interpret these criteria [such as
non-essential elements] in the abstract; the very wide range of measures that
might be envisaged in a given situation precludes any attempt at
classification.”79 While no genuine abstract criterion may be identified in the
Court’s case law, the test set out above does allow a more structured approach
than simply dealing with it ad hoc. From this perspective, the Court’s case law
should be evaluated positively, as it puts a check on a dominant legislature and
because it (modestly) enhances foreseeability.
4.2. The non-delegation doctrine in Article 290 TFEU
While Article 290 TFEU obviously allows for the delegation of (materially)
legislative powers, the Treaty provision also enshrines a non-delegation
doctrine. Firstly Article 290 TFEU prescribes an essentiality test (see above).
Secondly, it contains a specificity test, prescribing that the “objectives,
content, scope and duration of the delegation of power should be explicitly
defined.”80 As Kollmeyer notes, some authors find that these elements are
part of the essentiality test,81 while in fact the two should be seen as distinct.
This is clear if one considers the logic underlying a delegation. Under Article
290 TFEU this ratio is not that the Commission might decide on (all)
non-essential elements, but instead that decision-making is done more
efficiently than possible under a legislative procedure. By definition then, a
delegation is an exception to the rule and any exception ought to be reasoned
and properly circumscribed in order to remain an exception. If the legislature
did not define the “objectives, content, scope and duration” of a delegation,
78. The Parliament noted that the Commission’s “delegated power can only consist in
supplementing or amending parts of a legislative act which the Legislator does not consider to
be essential.” See Resolution of 5 May 2010, O.J. 2011, C 81E/6. The Council Legal Service
was less adamant but still noted that “[t]he legislature has a considerable margin of discretion in
determining the essential and nonessential elements of the acts it adopts.” See Council Legal
Service, 11 Apr. 2011, 8970/11.
79. European Commission, COM(2009)673, at 4.
80. Confusing the two tests, see Hofmann, op. cit. supra note 25, at 488–9.
81. Kollmeyer, Delegierte Rechtsetzung in der EU – Eine Analyse der Art. 290 und 291
AEUV (Nomos, 2015), p. 266.
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even if it decided on all the essential elements, the exceptional character of the
delegation would not be ensured.
The question of whether, apart from the explicit essentiality and specificity
tests,82 further non-delegation elements could be read into Article 290 TFEU
does not seem too far-fetched in light of the Court’s pre-Lisbon case law.83
The case in point here is Alliance for Natural Health, in which the Court set
strict limits to the Commission’s power to amend legislative acts. One would
assume that in this case of pre-Lisbon comitology the Court would simply
apply its traditional Köster test. The Court indeed did so but also imposed
further limitations: “[W]hen the Community legislature wishes to delegate its
power to amend aspects of the legislative act at issue, it must ensure that that
power is clearly defined and that the exercise of the power is subject to strict
review in the light of objective criteria (see, to that effect, Meroni v. High
Authority) . . . In this instance . . . the recitals to Directive 2002/46 . . . limit
the Commission’s power to modify the lists through their reference to
objective criteria connected exclusively with public health. They show that in
this instance the Community legislature laid down the essential criteria to be
applied in the matter when the powers thus delegated are exercised (see, to that
effect, Case 25/70 Köster).”84
The Court here confused its case law on legislative conferrals to the
Commission (Köster) with Commission delegations to private bodies
(Meroni).85 It should be clear however that if the Commission’s power under
Article 290TFEU were also governed by theMeroni doctrine,86 then the scope
left for the Commission to adopt any delegated acts would be extremely
limited, since it could not exercise any discretionary powers. While this case
law has not yet been transposed to the delegation regime under Article 290
TFEU,87 such a transposition cannot a priori be excluded and Alliance for
Natural Health in any case shows how further implied non-delegation
82. For an illustration of how the Courts can review Commission (in)action in the light of
the legislative mandate, see Case T-521/14, Sweden v. Commission, EU:T:2015:976.
83. However, Craig notes: “Whether the Community courts would be willing to [enforce a
non-delegation doctrine] with vigour remains to be seen, and history does not indicate vigorous
judicial enforcement of such criteria by the Community courts.” See Craig, “The Role of the
European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty”, in Griller and Ziller (Eds.), The Lisbon Treaty:
EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty (Springer, 2008), p. 116.
84. Joined cases C-154 & 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health, EU:C:2005:449, paras.
90–92.
85. For a discussion, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 222–224.
86. Case 9/56, Meroni and Co. v. High Authority, EU:C:1958:7.
87. Several authors seem to miss this point when they suggest that the Commission’s power
under Art. 290 (or 291)TFEU could be tested under theMeroni doctrine. See Nieto Garrido and
Martín Delgado, European Administrative Law in the Constitutional Treaty (Hart Publishing,
2007), p. 13; Voermans, Hartmann and Kaeding, op. cit. supra note 72, at 17–18. See also infra
note 136.
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elements could be read into Article 290 TFEU (or Art. 291 TFEU for that
matter).
In the post-Lisbon Connecting Europe Facility case88 the Parliament
challenged a delegated act of the Commission89 because the delegated act
amended its basic legislative act while the latter only allowed the Commission
to specify certain funding priorities (“detailing” them).90 Indeed, the basic
legislative act did not refer to the notions of “amending” or “supplementing”
as may be found in Article 290 TFEU. The case thus raised some fundamental
issues: what is the relationship between amending and supplementing? and
what does the legislature’s silence mean for the Commission’s power to adopt
delegated acts? Advocate General Jääskinen concluded that if the legislature
uses ambiguous terms then the Commission is left the choice of how the
delegated act will affect the basic legislative act, since the legal effects of an
amendment or supplementation are the same (see further below). After all, if
both branches of the legislature had been adamant about not letting the
Commission amend their legislative act, they could always have used the
notion of supplementation foreseen in Article 290 TFEU itself.91
In a perhaps unexpected dogmatic turn, the ECJ found differently. While it
agreed with the Advocate General that there are only two types of delegated
act,92 it attached special importance to the distinction between amending and
supplementing, ignoring its earlier Visa reciprocity ruling (see further below).
Thus, when the Commission supplements an act it has a more limited
authority and must conform to the entire basic legislative act.93 While this is
true, the Court hereby seems to overemphasize the effects of a typical
amending delegated act. Such amendments normally merely relate to
updating the annexes of legislative acts,94 or to update EU legislative acts in
light of the EU’s international obligations.95 A supplementing delegated act
can then be used to achieve the same results as an amending delegated act,
with the exception of adding provisions that would directly contravene
provisions in the legislative act.Yet, the Court found a fundamental difference
between the two types of delegated act and found support for this in the Lisbon
Treaty’s travaux préparatoires and in the Commission’s own internal
88. Case C-286/14, Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2016:183.
89. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 275/2014, O.J. 2014, L 80/1.
90. See Art. 21 (3) of Regulation (EU) 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, O.J. 2013, L 348/129.
91. The A.G. also hinted at this, see Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Case C-286/14,
Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2015:645, para 62.
92. Case C-286/14, Parliament v. Commission, para 32.
93. Ibid., paras. 41–42.
94. For a discussion, see Kollmeyer, op. cit. supra note 81, pp. 140–53.
95. Ibid., pp. 148–9.
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guidelines relating to Article 290 TFEU. In both, “amending” is juxtaposed to
“fleshing out the detail”. In light of this, the Court found that if the legislature
allows the Commission to “detail” certain funding priorities, this should be
understood as allowing the Commission to only supplement the legislative act.
The Court’s ruling strengthened the non-delegation doctrine in Article 290
TFEU and may prove to complicate delegated law-making merely for the sake
of a legal nicety.As will be elaborated below, it may be questioned whether the
Court should not also have scrutinized the legislative regulation in light of its
earlier ruling in Biocides.
4.3. The demarcation line between delegated and implementing acts
Unlike the first demarcation line, the one distinguishing delegated from
implementing acts did not exist pre-Lisbon when both functions were
qualified as implementation and both were exercised under the comitology
regime. The Treaty authors should therefore be lauded for distinguishing
these two radically different functions, prescribing different procedures and
different acts depending on whether an executive law-making function or an
implementing function is exercised. While this clarification was also
generally supported in legal doctrine,96 it was clear from the outset that certain
measures “supplementing a legislative act” might at the same time be
qualified as measures ensuring “the uniform implementation” of a binding
EU legal act and vice versa. Still, there was disagreement whether such an
overlap would have to be tolerated or whether the Court should enforce the
distinction between the two acts strictly.97
4.3.1. The confirmation of a grey zone and the legislature’s discretion:
Biocides and Visa reciprocity
Biocides98 presented the first case for the Court to clarify the demarcation
line. At issue was the validity of the legislature’s mandate to the Commission
to fix the fees payable to the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) under the
Biocides Regulation through implementing acts. According to the
Commission, it ought to have been granted a delegated instead of an
implementing power, since it was effectively asked to supplement instead of
96. Very critically however, see Vos, “Editorial: White and black smoke coming from the
Justus Lipsius building”, 11 MJ (2004), 252–232, at 228–230; Bergström, op. cit. supra note 19,
pp. 351–363.
97. Bast and Bianchi did not find the overlap problematic. See Bast, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 920–921; Bianchi, “La comitologie est morte! Vive la comitologie!”, 48 RTDE (2012),
75–116, at 93. For authors that argued for a (more) strict separation, see infra footnotes 124
and 130.
98. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:170.
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implement the Regulation, the legislature merely having defined general
principles which could not be readily implemented.
The ECJ set out its decision by identifying the functions of the two acts,
finding that a delegated act is used “to achieve the adoption of rules coming
within the regulatory framework as defined by the basic legislative act”,99
while an implementing act allows the Commission “to provide further detail in
relation to the content of a legislative act, in order to ensure that it is
implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States.”100 Crucially
then, the Court confirmed that the legislature has a discretion in choosing
between the two and that, as a result, it would only intervene if the legislature
has manifestly erred when granting the one or the other power to the
Commission. Evidently, this meant that the Court rejected the Commission’s
argument on Articles 290 and 291 TFEU constituting two mutually exclusive
realms. The Court then concluded that the legislature could reasonably have
taken the view that its framework applicable to the fees was complete and
therefore merely required further implementation, rather than
supplementation, by the Commission.
In Visa reciprocity,101 the Commission again challenged a legislative
mandate but this time it had received a delegated power, arguing that it ought
to have been conferred an implementing power. The Court in Visa reciprocity
confirmed its previous ruling in Biocides and also resolved a number of
ambiguities that had persisted following Biocides.102 As to the facts of the
case, Visa reciprocity dealt with the mechanism to suspend or retract visa
waivers for the nationals of those third countries that impose visa
requirements on Schengen-nationals. The mechanism follows several stages
where firstly a visa exemption may be suspended through an implementing
act; in the second stage the suspension is effectuated through a delegated act
which also adds a footnote next to the third country concerned in the annex to
the basic legislative regulation. Finally, in a third stage the Commission may
submit a legislative proposal amending the basic legislative regulation.
The Commission argued that in the second stage it would simply be
implementing the rules of the basic regulation and that adding a footnote next
to an entry in an annex to the basic legislative act could not be qualified as an
amendment in the sense of Article 290 TFEU.103 As to the legal effects of the
99. Ibid., para 38.
100. Ibid., para 39.
101. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:499.
102. See Ritleng, “The dividing line between delegated and implementing acts: The Court
of Justice sidesteps the difficulty in Commission v. Parliament and Council (Biocides)”, 52
CML Rev. (2015), 243–257, at 250–257.
103. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 20.
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addition of such a footnote, the Commission argued that it was “a mere
technical tool used abusively in order to disguise the implementing act as a
delegated act.”104
In its decision, the ECJ confirmed again that the legislature has a wide
discretion when choosing between Article 290 or 291 TFEU, something
which was still debated following Biocides.105 Also in line with Biocides, the
Court refused to elaborate the Treaty framework by identifying further
criteria. It thereby unambiguously noted that “neither the existence nor the
extent of the discretion conferred on it by the legislative act is relevant for
determining whether the act to be adopted by the Commission comes under
Article 290 TFEU or Article 291 TFEU.”106 This part of Visa reciprocity
overrules the General Court’s finding in Czech Republic v. Commission (see
above).107 Differently fromBiocides however, the Court did not really connect
the two Treaty provisions any more. In Biocides it still noted that “the concept
of an implementing act within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU must be
assessed in relation to the concept of a delegated act, as derived from Article
290 TFEU”108 but in Visa reciprocity the Court found that it only needed to
be ascertained whether the conditions of Article 290 TFEU were met, i.e.
whether the Commission had been empowered to adopt acts of general
application amending (or supplementing) the non-essential elements of the
basic legislative act.109 The Court found that this was indeed the case, and
dismissed the Commission’s action. It thereby noted that the three stages of
the mechanism are “characterized by measures of increasing gravity and
political sensitivity, to which instruments of different kinds correspond.”
While this idea of increasing gravity has a certain appeal, it does not really
find a basis in the Treaties.110
Finally, as to the question whether the basic legislative act would be
amended by the Commission’s delegated acts, the Court noted that they would
104. Ibid., para 21.
105. See Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 102, at 254; Chamon, “Clarifying the divide between
delegated and implementing acts?”, 42 LIEI (2015), 175–189, at 184–188; Buchanan, “The
conferral of power to the Commission put to the test”, 5 EJRR (2014), 267–272, at 271.
106. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 32.
107. The margin of discretion left to the Commission had also been suggested in doctrine as
a criterion to distinguish Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU. See Jacqué, “Introduction: Pouvoir législatif
et exécutif dans l’UE”, in Auby and Dutheil de la Rochère (Eds.),DroitAdministratif Européen
(Bruylant, 2007), p. 47; Kröll, op. cit. supra note 1, at 284; Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 575.
See also infra note 136.
108. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council.
109. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 32.
110. Indeed, the idea of “increasing gravity” should not be confused with a hierarchy of
norms which is generally read into Arts. 289, 290 and 291 TFEU. Even on this however Bast
notes that “the Treaty does not provide for a hierarchical distinction between delegated and
implementing acts.” See Bast, op. cit. supra note 26, at 924.
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have “the effect of amending, if only temporarily, the normative content of the
legislative act in question.”111 In this regard, the importance of the footnote
was relativized by the Court and taken to demonstrate “the intention of the EU
legislature to insert the act adopted on the basis of [the contested] provision in
the actual body of [the legislative regulation], as amended.”112 In Visa
reciprocity, then, the Court seems to accept that a legislative act may
effectively be amended without an actual change to the text of that act.
However in in Connecting Europe Facility (see above) the Court again opted
to understand “amending” in a formal sense.
4.3.2. Reviewing an implementing act in light of the legislative mandate:
Eures network
In Eures network,113 the Parliament challenged a Commission decision
implementing Regulation 492/2011 setting out the basic rules on the free
movement of workers. Article 38 of the regulation generally provided: “The
Commission shall adopt measures pursuant to this Regulation for its
implementation.” This Article was the legal basis of the contested Decision
through which the Commission set up the Eures network promoting labour
mobility inter alia by allowing the exchange of information between national
authorities on job vacancies and applications. In its application, the Parliament
argued that the Commission had overstepped its mandate, since the contested
decision supplemented certain non-essential elements of the regulation.114
Eures network therefore offered an opportunity to the Court to clarify both the
notion of supplementation and the dividing line between implementing and
delegated acts.
In its ruling, the Court rightly remarked that the present case differed from
Biocides since it was not the legislature’s choice that was challenged but the
exercise by the Commission of the powers conferred by the legislature.115 The
Court recalled the function of an implementing act as defined in Biocides,116
and recalled its pre-Lisbon case law following which the Commission may
“adopt all the measures which are necessary or appropriate for the
implementation of [a basic] act, provided that they are not contrary to it” and
111. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 42 (emphasis added).
Pre-Visa reciprocity, Kröll had already argued that the notion of amendment could also cover
such a situation. See Kröll, op. cit. supra note 1, at 267.
112. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 43.
113. Case C-65/13, Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2289.
114. See Action brought on 7 Feb. 2013 – European Parliament v. European Commission,
O.J. 2013, C 108/17.
115. Case C-65/13, Parliament v. Commission, para 42.
116. Ibid., para 43.
Implementation of legislation 1523
provided that they comply with the basic act’s essential general aims,117
without, in the light of Article 290 TFEU, amending or supplementing the
basic legislative act.118 The Court thus seemed to de facto accept a
discretionary power for the Commission, although it was careful to avoid
referring to the Commission’s powers as “wide”, as it had done in the
pre-Lisbon case law which it cited.
The Court then applied its test, scrutinizing the provisions flagged by the
Parliament after having identified the “essential general aims” of the
Regulation. By focusing on these essential general aims,119 the Court put
the bar very high for the Parliament to show that the Commission acted ultra
vires. Indeed, the Court subsequently rejected all the Parliament’s arguments,
noting that even if the arrangements adopted by the Commission were not
explicitly foreseen by the legislature, they all served the “essential general
aims” of the Regulation.120 Further, the Commission had not erred in judging
them “necessary or appropriate” to implement the Regulation. Finally, the
Court also concluded that the arrangements did not amend or supplement
the framework set out by the legislative act,121 meaning they were genuine
implementing measures. This brief résumé may give the impression that the
Court only exercised a marginal review, requiring a manifest error on the part
of the Commission to be shown, but the Court actually did not emphasize any
significant Commission discretion in this respect (see also above) and went
through the different elements of the Parliament’s plea exhaustively (although
perhaps not thoroughly).
4.3.3. Drawing the dividing line between delegated and implementing acts
How has the Court drawn the dividing line and how has it (re-)defined the
institutional balance laid down in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU? Although the
Court confirmed that the two types of act perform different functions, it has
not imposed an impermeable border between them, thereby rejecting the
117. Ibid., para 44.
118. Ibid., para 45.
119. Emphasizing the “essential general aims” of the legislative regulation, see paras. 44,
46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 58 of Case C-65/13, Parliament v. Commission (Eures network).
120. A.G. Cruz Villalón however proposed to uphold the action on one plea, since the
coordination office was also tasked with “developing a general approach to labour mobility”,
whereas under the legislative regulation it only had a technical and practical role. See Opinion
of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case C-65/13, Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2071, paras.
69–79.
121. Emphasizing the framework set by the legislative regulation (and how the contested
decision did not divert from it), see paras. 60, 64, 67, 70, 71, 82, 87, 92 of Case C-65/13,
Parliament v. Commission (Eures network).
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Commission’s longstanding claim that they are mutually exclusive.122 That
claim should be contrasted to that of the Council Legal Service which had
argued that “it is just as clear that in use, the two procedures are not exclusive
categories, but overlap considerably.”123 The Court confirmed that the
legislature has a wide discretion in choosing between the two Articles,124
whereas some had initially feared too great a Commission discretion.125
Obviously, when making its choice the legislature has to respect the conditions
foreseen in the Treaty provisions but those minimum conditions at the same
time now appear to be maximum conditions.126
From an institutional balance perspective, the Council (as the legislature)
enjoys significant powers under Article 290 TFEU, but also under Article 291
TFEU since the comitology committees are composed of national experts.
While the Commission may exercise executive powers under both provisions,
decision-making through comitology is more technocratic, while
decision-making under Article 290 TFEU is politicizable. Lastly, the
Parliament will have a clear preference for empowering the Commission
under Article 290 TFEU, given its control powers and its marginal role under
Article 291 TFEU. The effects of the Court’s rulings are then favourable to the
Council and the Member States. The Commission on the other hand is left
with little leverage. While the Parliament is part of the ordinary legislature, the
lack of further criteria is not conducive to its institutional position either, given
its absence in comitology procedures.127
122. In its 2009 communication, the Commission noted: “[A]n act based on Art. 290 is by
definition excluded from the scope of Art. 291, and vice versa. The authors of the new Treaty
clearly intended the two Arts. to be mutually exclusive.” See COM(2009)673, at 3.
123. Council Legal Service, 8970/11, point 10.
124. Such a discretionary choice for the legislature had traditionally been rejected. See e.g.
Stancanelli, op. cit. supra note 36, p. 524; Schütze, op. cit. supra note 28, at 690. However,
arguing in favour of such a discretion, see Bast, op. cit. supra note 26, at 921.
125. See Sydow, “Europäische exekutive Rechtsetzung zwischen Kommission,
Komitologieausschüssen, Parlament und Rat”, 67 JZ (2012), 157–165, at 159–160; Bergström,
op. cit. supra note 19, p. 357. Of course, this choice would not be in the hands of the
Commission as noted by Ponzano, “‘Executive’ and ‘delegated’ acts: The situation after the
Lisbon Treaty”, in Griller and Ziller (Eds.), The LisbonTreaty: EU Constitutionalism without a
Constitutional Treaty (Springer, 2008), p. 140. Still Blumann is right to point out that the
Commission will influence this in its legislative proposals. See Blumann, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 257.
126. The Parliament in its 2010 resolution had also rejected “the insertion in basic acts of
provisions imposing on the Legislator additional obligations over and above those already
contained in Art. 290 TFEU.” See O.J. 2011, C 81E/6, point 10.
127. In its 2014 (pre-Biocides) resolution, the Parliament listed a number of further criteria
that could help draw the distinction between Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU. See Parliament
resolution of 25 Feb. 2014 on follow-up on the delegation of legislative powers and control by
Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, point 1.
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It is worth noting again that the Court explicitly confirmed the legislature’s
discretion and this differently from the other grey zone, i.e. that between the
essential and the non-essential elements, although the Court in both cases
scrutinizes in rather extensive fashion the legislature’s choice.128 The same
goes for the Court’s scrutiny of the Commission’s implementing act in Eures
network, where the Court de facto confirms the Commission’s significant
discretion, while still extensively scrutinizing the act in light of the legislative
mandate.
Since the Court confirmed that the two types of act have different functions
one could try to develop a reasoning along these lines but here the problem
would also be that the functions are defined vaguely and in an overlapping
way. After all, the power to “adopt rules coming within the regulatory
framework as defined by the basic legislative act”, which is the function of a
delegated act, seems to apply a fortiori to an implementing act, since the
“further detail which they provide in relation to the content of a legislative act”
should necessarily remain within the framework set by the legislative act – as
confirmed in Eures network.
In this regard, a tension between Connecting Europe Facility and Biocides
may also be noted. In the first case, the mandate “to add further detail” by way
of a delegated act was interpreted by the ECJ as a mandate to supplement the
legislative act. In light of Biocides then, the legislature had prescribed
delegated acts to perform the function of an implementing act (adding further
detail). Evidently, the Parliament inConnecting Europe Facility had not raised
an objection of illegality against its own act, but it could be argued that the
Court should have done so of its own motion,129 finding both the illegality of
the delegated regulation and its legal basis in the legislative act. The Court’s
restraint in this area means that the Lisbon Treaty’s redefined institutional
balance is not enforced in practice, the reform being partially undone.130 In
Community method terms, the Court’s restraint means that certain issues are
still (wholly) left to the political arena instead of the Court imposing abstract
criteria structuring the political process.
128. Whether this extensive scrutiny is also thorough may be debated in light of the
legislature’s discretion. On this tension, see also Chamon, “The dividing line between delegated
and implementing acts, part two: The Court of Justice settles the issue in Commission v.
Parliament and Council (Visa reciprocity)”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 1617–1633, at 1621–1622.
129. That this possibility exists was confirmed early on, see Case 14/59, Société des
Fonderies de Pont-à-Mouson v.High Authority, EU:C:1959:31, p. 230. Whether it was possible
in casu depends on whether the issue concerned a matter of public policy. See in this regard also
the criteria developed by A.G. Jacobs in his Opinion to Case C-210/98 P, Salzgitter v.
Commission, EU:C:2000:172, paras. 139–43.
130. In this respect Kröll noted in 2011: “Eine trennscharfe Abgrenzung der
Geltungsbereiche von Art 290 und 291 AEUV ist zur Wahrung des institutionellen
Gleichgewichts unabdingbar.” See Kröll, op. cit. supra note 1, at 267.
CML Rev. 20161526 Chamon
4.3.4. Implementing, supplementing and amending clarified
The above cases shed light on how the crucial notions of implementation,
supplementation and amendment are to be understood. Thus, Biocides tells us
that implementation means adding further detail. Stressing the further detail
implies that an implementing act can only add detail to something that is
already provided in the basic act. However, the Court does not apply this in an
overtly strict manner and is satisfied if the basic act provides for the “essential
general aims”, as is clear from Eures network. If that is the case, the
Commission has the power to adopt any implementing measure that is
necessary or appropriate. Eures network therefore confirms the continued
relevance of the broad (pre-Lisbon) notion of implementation which left quite
some discretion to the Commission.
So when does adding further detail cease to be implementation and instead
become supplementation? The Court stressing the framework established by
the legislative act in Eures network would suggest that as long as the
Commission does not change the framework of the basic act, it is not
supplementing that act. However, in Biocides, the Court also defined the
function of the delegated act as adopting “rules coming within the regulatory
framework as defined by the basic legislative act”, while in Visa reciprocity it
ruled that “neither the existence nor the extent of the discretion conferred on
it by the legislative act is relevant for determining whether the act to be
adopted by the Commission comes under Article 290 TFEU or Article 291
TFEU.”131 This shows that both under implementation and supplementation,
and contrary to the institutions’ original positions,132 the framework of the
basic act can never be changed and the level of discretion left to the
Commission is immaterial for the choice between Article 290 and 291 TFEU.
In light of this, can it be concluded that, substantively, an implementing act
can effecte everything which is in the scope of a delegated act (bar the formal
131. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 32.
132. In its 2009 Communication, the Commission noted that if “the future measure
specifically adds new non-essential rules which change the framework of the legislative act,
leaving a margin of discretion to the Commission …, the measure could be deemed to
‘supplement’ the basic instrument.” See p. 4 (emphasis added). In its 2014 resolution, the
Parliament noted that a delegated act “should be used where the basic act leaves a considerable
margin of discretion to the Commission to supplement the legislative framework laid down in
the basic act.” In its 2011 opinion, the Council Legal Service noted that if a “future measure will
add new (non-essential) rules which expand the legislative framework of the basic act,
particularly by leaving a considerable margin of discretion to the Commission . . . it could be
considered . . . that the measure ‘supplements’ the basic act.” See point 17 (emphasis added).
(All 3 documents cited supra note 35). However, inVisa reciprocity, the Council had argued that
the level of discretion conferred on the Commission is “not relevant to any decision choosing
between delegated acts and implementing acts.” See Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Case
C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:304, para 23. See also Bast, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 920.
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amendment of a legislative act)?133 Focusing on the framework set by the
legislative act, such a suggestion should be rejected. Indeed, neither the
delegated act nor the implementing act can redefine that framework, but
the implementing act needs to take the framework as a given and give practical
effect to it, while the delegated act can still elaborate the framework with
further rules as long as they come within the framework as defined in the
legislative act. It is also for this reason that Article 291 TFEU does not impose
substantive limits or refer to the essential elements,134 unlike Article 290
TFEU: the question of whether an implementing act can touch on essential
elements does not arise, since an implementing act serves to give practical
effect to the legislative act and can never, unlike the delegated act, change the
legislative act.135
The Court’s further finding that the Commission’s discretion cannot be
used as an element to distinguish the delegated from the implementing act may
then turn out to be a double-edged sword for the Commission,136 since it also
133. In this regard, Kollmeyer remarks that in the freezing of (suspected) terrorists’ assets,
implementing acts are used to formally amend legislative acts. See Kollmeyer, op. cit. supra
note 81, pp. 172–175. Bast argues in favour of allowing implementing acts to amend basic
legislative acts but inter alia relies in this on what Craig has dubbed the transitional
classification problem (see Craig, op. cit. supra note 34, at 675–77): some pre-Lisbon
comitology procedures allowed for the amendment of legislative acts, meaning an
implementing act (in the post-Lisbon sense) could amend legislation. See Bast, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 922–923. However in light of Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU it seems more proper to argue
that the transitional classification problem should instead be rectified. See also see Craig, op.
cit. supra note 34, at 674.
134. Noting this difference between Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU, see Schütze, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 687. Bergström found that the pre-Lisbon regulatory comitology procedure could be
used to “apply the essential provisions of a legislative act” while, post-Lisbon, a delegated act
could not be used for this. See Bergström, op. cit. supra note 19, p. 357. However, the real issue
here is that the delegated act should in any case not be used to apply a legislative act’s
provisions.
135. Hofmann’s suggestion to the effect that “[f]rom a teleologic point of view, however,
[the non-delegation doctrine in Art. 290 TFEU] should also be applicable for the distinction
between legislative and implementing acts” would further blur the difference between delegated
and implementing acts. See Hofmann, op. cit. supra note 25, at 488. Voermans’ conclusion
illustrates this when he finds that “conferring an implementing power [under Art. 291 TFEU]
of a general nature constitutes a delegation within the meaning of Art. 290 of the TFEU as well,
so the delegation conditions would likely apply.” See Voermans, “The birth of a legislature: The
EU Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty”, 17 Brown Journal of World Affairs (2011), 163–180,
at 170. This should be contrasted with Blumann who rightly notes that Art. 291 TFEU not
referring to essential elements “paraît justifié puisque cette dernière n’a pas pour vocation de
compléter ou de modifier un acte de base mais uniquement d’en faciliter la mise en œuvre.” See
Blumann, op. cit. supra note 28, at 27.
136. Earlier the Commission had noted that its powers under Art. 291 TFEU are “purely
executive” whereas those under Art. 290 TFEU are “always discretionary”. See
COM(2009)673, at 3. The Court did not pick up this suggestion and luckily so, given that
“purely executive” implementing powers much resembles the Court’s language inMeroni. See
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means that it becomes more difficult to show that the Commission has
misused its powers when adopting implementing acts.
Finally, there is the notion of amending which originally did not seem to be
problematic.137 “Amending” under Article 290 TFEU was understood as an
intervention in the actual text of a legislative act. It is for this reason that the
legislature had prescribed in the legislative act at issue in Visa reciprocity that
a footnote be added to the annex. Without the addition of such a footnote, the
Commission’s delegated act would not result in a formal amendment of the
legislative act. However, in its ruling, the Court adopted a broad understanding
of the notion of amending and included in it those measures that in their effect
change the normative content of a legislative act. The technique whereby the
legislature had, abusively according to the Commission, prescribed a formal
amendment to the legislative act, therefore became irrelevant. A delegated act
may then amend a legislative act without formally changing that act. However,
this Visa reciprocity-notion of amendment was ignored by the Court in
Connecting Europe Facility, when it stressed that amending means
“modify[ing] or repeal[ing] non-essential elements laid down by the
legislature in [a legislative] act.”138
How does this issue in Visa reciprocity and Connecting Europe impact on
the institutional balance? While the former may strengthen the position of the
Commission beyond the actual wording of Article 290 TFEU, the latter
reflects the institutional balance in that Article better. After all, since the
distinction was introduced by the Treaty authors, it ought to be of relevance.
Yet, in Connecting Europe Facility, the Court may have leaned to the other
side, since it did more than simply distinguishing the two. This becomes clear
if the Court’s approach is juxtaposed to that of the US Supreme Court, which
has a rather consistent case law in which ambiguity in legislative drafting is
taken as proof of Congress’ intent to delegate power to the administration.139
The verb “to detail” indeed seems ambiguous if one has to classify it as either
also supra note 87. In its 2014 resolution, the Parliament also found that the Commission has
considerable discretion under Art. 290 TFEU but only limited discretion under Art. 291 TFEU.
See European Parliament Resolution of 25 Feb. 2014, point 1.
137. See Council Legal Service, 11 Apr. 2011, 8970/11, p. 6; COM(2009)673, at 4.
138. Case C-286/14, Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2016:183, para 42.
139. The seminal case in this regard is Chevron, see US Supreme Court, Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., [1984] 467 United States Reports 837,
842–843. For a finding that Chevron did not apply when an agency is authorized to modify
legislation, since the term modify is unambiguous, see US Supreme Court, MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., [1994] 512 United
States Reports 218, 225–226.
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meaning supplementing or amending.140 The Court of Justice, unlike the
Advocate General, did not conclude from this ambiguity that it should be up to
the Commission to choose between supplementing or amending. It clarified
the institutional balance (in Art. 290 TFEU) in favour of the legislature, since
it read a hierarchy (into Art. 290 TFEU) between amending and
supplementing even if there is no immediate basis for this in the Treaty.
4.4. Executive rule-making and Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
The Lisbon Treaty’s reform also raised the question what the new Articles
meant for the locus of executive powers at the EU level. Mindful of the aims of
the Laeken Declaration, one might expect that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
would constitute the framework for executive rule-making, making the
Commission the primary wielder of the executive function.141 However,
following the Lisbon Treaty executive power at EU level in general is still
shared.142 Firstly, Article 291 TFEU still allows the Council to be empowered
to adopt implementing acts, also outside the Common Foreign and Security
Policy.143 Secondly, the Treaties contain many enabling clauses, such as
Article 43(3) TFEU at issue in the Multi-annual cod plan cases (see above),
allowing the Council to adopt sui generis implementing measures.144 How
these relate to each other is not entirely clear. Kollmeyer argues that the
possibility foreseen in Article 291(2) TFEU is purely declaratory, confirming
the Council’s executive competences in cases such as Article 43(3) TFEU.145
However, a different reading of Article 291(2) TFEU would allow the EU
legislature to exceptionally entrust implementation to the Council, also in
cases not covered by provisions such as Article 43(3) TFEU. The issues when
140. Here it should be further noted that inMCI the Supreme Court simply had to interpret
a provision in a legislative act (i.e. the authority to modify), without having to interpret it in the
light of a provision of the Constitution (such as Art. 290 TFEU in Case C-286/14, Connecting
Europe Facility).
141. Blumann notes in this regard: “En matière d’exécution et de délégation, la
Commission paraît de plus en plus le détenteur unique de la fonction.” See Blumann, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 256 (emphasis added).
142. Craig, “European governance: Executive and administrative powers under the new
constitutional settlement”, 3 I-Con (2005), 407–439, at 421; Bermann, “Executive power in the
new European Constitution”, 3 I-Con (2005), 440–447, at 440.
143. Of course, since this possibility is expressly provided for under Art. 291 TFEU itself,
these exceptions could still be said to come under Art. 291 TFEU.
144. Criticizing this as more than “an aesthetic failing of the simplification effort”, see de
Witte, op. cit. supra note 27, pp. 100–102. See also Stancanelli, op. cit. supra note 36,
pp. 517–519.
145. Kollmeyer, op. cit. supra note 81, p. 350. However, this view is contradicted by the
recent Case C-113/14, Germany v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2016:635, paras. 56-57.
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the Council may exceptionally be empowered146 and how Council
implementing acts relate to Commission implementing acts147 will require
further clarification from the Court. Lastly, the Treaties also provide for sui
generis implementing powers of the Commission, e.g. in the area of the EU’s
competition policy. These observations beg the question whether there is
scope for further exceptions to the default framework for executive
decision-making.
4.4.1. The PRAC as an exception to Article 291 TFEU: Netherlands v.
Commission
In all respects, the PRAC is the odd-one-out following the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty. Acts adopted following the PRAC effectively fulfil the
same functions as delegated acts, but they are adopted following a comitology
procedure, even if they are not implementing acts under Article 291 TFEU.
The idea was to change all pre-Lisbon references to the PRAC in EU
legislation into references either to Article 290 or to the Comitology
Regulation, but the alignment process is taking longer than anticipated.
So which procedure should be followed when the Commission, in an act
adopted pursuant to the PRAC, prescribes that further “implementing”
measures may be adopted? The General Court was asked to provide guidance
in Netherlands v. Commission.148 The Commission had implemented (in the
pre-Lisbon sense) the Regulation on harmonized indices of consumer prices,
149 prescribing that Eurostat would adopt guidelines and manuals for the
national statistical offices but without prescribing a clear procedure to do
so.150 The Netherlands inter alia questioned the Commission’s acts on the
ground that it ought to have prescribed the PRAC to adopt the guidelines and
manuals, since that is the procedure indicated by the basic legislative act. In
the alternative, the Netherlands argued that the Commission ought to have
prescribed a procedure foreseen in the Comitology Regulation.
In a reasoning that may be supported, the General Court found that the
manuals and guidelines constituted implementing measures aimed at the
146. Pre-Lisbon, the Court’s scrutiny was rather marginal, see Case C-257/01,Commission
v. Council, EU:C:2005:25. Blumann finds that following Lisbon it should be more difficult to
empower the Council. See Blumann, op. cit. supra note 28, at 26; Blumann, op. cit. supra note
8, at 251. However, Kröll seems to suggest that this case law could also be applied post-Lisbon
despite the stricter wording of Art. 291(2) TFEU. See Kröll, op. cit. supra note 1, at 287.
147. Notably the question whether there is a hierarchy between the two. Pre-Lisbon case
law suggests there is, see Case C-159/96, Portugal v. Commission, EU:C:1998:550, para 41.
148. Joined Cases T-261/13 & T-86/14, Netherlands v. Commission, EU:T:2015:671.
149. Council Regulation (EC) 2494/95 concerning harmonized indices of consumer prices,
O.J. 1995, L 257/1.
150. Art. 1 of Commission Regulation (EU) 119/2013, O.J. 2013, L 41/1; Art. 4 of
Commission Regulation (EU) 93/2013, O.J. 2013, L 33/14.
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uniform application of the Council Regulation, thus meeting the definition of
implementing acts established by the ECJ in the Biocides case.151 However,
the conclusion the General Court drew from this finding was less sound, since
it annulled the relevant provisions of the Commission’s acts finding that the
Commission ought to have prescribed the PRAC.
This case does not clarify much when it comes to the adoption of soft law,
since the Court clearly indicated that the manuals and guidelines were binding
on the Member States’ authorities.152 At first sight then, Netherlands v.
Commission seems to indicate a concern on the part of the General Court for
the integrity of Article 291 TFEU. After all, had the Court followed the
Commission’s reasoning it might have resulted in sanctioning the possibility
to establish a new sphere of (de iure non-binding) executive acts outside the
framework of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.
In particular it is worth stressing the General Court’s qualification of
Eurostat’s measures, since it did not automatically follow from Biocides.
Indeed, it is not because the function of every implementing act is to add
further detail (Biocides), that every act adding further detail is necessarily an
implementing act (see also Connecting Europe Facility, and above).153 Still,
the General Court’s ultimate conclusion, i.e. that the PRAC ought to have
been prescribed, should be rejected. Indeed, had the General Court looked into
Article 2(2) of the second comitology decision, it would have had to conclude
that the measures in casu fell outside the PRAC’s field of application. After
all, in post-Lisbon terms, measures adopted pursuant to the PRAC are not
implementing measures but measures which amend or supplement formal
legislation (these measures do come under the pre-Lisbon notion of
implementation). Thus, having found that the measures in casu are
(post-Lisbon) implementing measures, the Court should have concluded that
the PRAC was a fortiori not applicable and that the Commission should have
prescribed one of the procedures foreseen in the Comitology Regulation.154
151. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 39.
152. Joined Cases T-261/13 & T-86/14, Netherlands v. Commission, para 48.
153. The General Court (at para 49) inter alia remarked that the Commission’s reasoning
would result in accepting the legality of secondary legal bases, an institutional practice which
the ECJ had repudiated earlier.
154. This solution would have been similar to the one inCommonMarket Fertilizers. In that
case the ECJ sanctioned the Commission’s choice for a de facto advisory comitology procedure
in an implementing measure even if the basic legislative act referred to the regulatory
comitology procedure. The Court did so because the further acts to be adopted were individual
measures, whereas the regulatory procedure could only be used (according to the second
comitology decision) to adopt measures of general application. See Case C-443/05 P, Common
Market Fertilizers SA v. Commission, EU:C:2007:511. For a discussion, see Kollmeyer, op. cit.
supra note 81, pp. 317–318.
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4.4.2. Uniform conditions may not be sufficiently uniform: Spain v.
Parliament and Council
The scope of Article 291 TFEU partially depends on how the reference to
“uniform conditions” in paragraph 2 is understood. Evidently, the easier this
threshold is reached, the easier it is to confer implementing powers on the
Commission. Spain v.Parliament andCouncil155 was one of the many cases in
the saga on the Unitary Patent Package. In casu, Spain had challenged the
validity of Regulation 1257/2012 inter alia citing a violation of Article 291(2)
TFEU since the Regulation instructed the Member States to set up a
committee within the European Patent Office (EPO) (and therefore outside
the EU) entrusting it with the task of deciding on the level and distribution of
the renewal fees for unitary patents. In doing so, the committee had to respect
the principles set out in Articles 12 and 13 of the Regulation, similarly to the
situation at issue in Biocides. Just like in Biocides, the Court concluded that
this qualified as implementation, albeit that it was implementation under
Article 291(1) TFEU. Unfortunately, the Court’s reasoning fails to convince,
since it argued that the Regulation instructs the Member States to give the EPO
committee these tasks,156 and that the EU Regulation is a special agreement
within the meaning of Article 142 of the European Patent Convention
(EPC).157 While the latter may be true for the purposes of the EPC, this is not
the case from an EU perspective. An act of secondary EU legislation cannot
derogate from primary law, and as a result, a regulation cannot deviate from
Article 291 TFEU even if it qualifies as a special agreement under the EPC.
The Court tried to take the sting out of the problem by finding that the level
and distribution of the renewal fees in any event did not necessarily need to be
implemented under uniform conditions (the condition for Art. 291(2) TFEU
to apply),158 but this fails to convince completely: to renew a patent with
unitary effect it is only logical that a uniform fee is paid. The negotiations
within the committee on the renewal fees are testimony to this, since the
president of the EPO had to work out different proposals before a compromise
could be reached,159 but in all the proposals the fees were set uniformly and
there was not even mention of the possibility to set them other than in a
155. Case C-146/13, Spain v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:298.
156. Ibid., para 72.
157. Ibid., para 82.
158. Ibid., para 81.A.G. Bot dealt with this issue equally unconvincingly by finding that the
principles set by the legislature did not leave any discretion to the Member States (which has
been disproved by the difficult negotiations within the committee). See Opinion of A.G. Bot in
Case C-146/13, Spain v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:2380, paras. 125–126.
159. See Decision of the Select Committee of the Administrative Council of 15 Dec. 2015
adopting the Rules relating to Fees for Unitary Patent Protection, SC/D 2/15.
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uniform manner.160 While the very specific context in which this case was
ruled should be recognized, the Court’s interpretation of the requirement of
uniform conditions risks undermining Article 291(2) TFEU.
4.4.3. Executive measures outside Article 290 and 291 TFEU:
Short-selling
The idea that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU make up the default framework for
executive rule-making was also undermined by the Short-selling case, in
which the question at issue inter alia was whether the EU legislature can
entrust an EU agency (a body not foreseen under the Treaties) to adopt
binding measures that de factomeet the requirements and fulfil the function of
the implementing act as defined in Article 291 TFEU. Before the financial
crisis, the EU lacked a framework to regulate short-selling161 which
Regulation 2012/236 has now introduced. The Regulation in the first place
leaves it to the national authorities to address risks. Exceptionally, however, it
also creates an emergency intervention power for the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) if this is necessary for the orderly functioning and
integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the
financial system in the Union.
In light of Article 291 TFEU it seems clear that in such cases the
Regulation’s common framework needs to be implemented under uniform
conditions, begging the question whether such a power may be granted to the
agency and should not instead be granted to the Commission (or exceptionally
the Council). In answering this question, the Court remarked that it was
“called upon to adjudicate on whether the authors of the FEU Treaty intended
to establish, in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU, a single legal framework
under which certain delegated and executive powers may be attributed solely
to the Commission or whether other systems for the delegation of such powers
to Union bodies, offices or agencies may be contemplated by the Union
legislature.”162 Remarkably and without looking at the travaux préparatoires
or without relying on a “genetic” argument, the Court answered its second
question positively: the power entrusted to the ESMA allegedly did not
“correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 TFEU and 291
TFEU.”163 While such a non-correspondence could still result in either the
legality or illegality of ESMA’s power (depending on whether Arts. 290 and
160. See President of the EPO, Proposals for the level of renewal fees for European patents
with unitary effect, 06/03/2015, SC/4/15; President of the EPO,Adjusted proposals for the level
of renewal fees for European patents with unitary effect, 07/05/2015, SC/18/15.
161. Recital 1 of the Preamble to Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council, O.J. 2012, L 86/1.
162. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Council and Parliament, EU:C:2014:18, para 78.
163. Ibid., para 83.
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291 TFEU form an open or closed system), the Court concluded by finding
that ESMA’s power could not be “regarded as undermining the rules
governing the delegation of powers laid down in Articles 290 TFEU and 291
TFEU.”164
The Court not only declared the Treaty framework to be an “open”
framework, but it also failed to lay down any serious limits to the legislature’s
discretion in choosing between empowering the Commission or empowering
an agency. In its reasoning, the Court simply refers to the fact that ESMA is
called upon to act in “an area which requires the deployment of specific
technical and professional expertise.”165 Ohler and Skowron have noted that
this makes it easier for the legislature to empower an agency than it is to
empower the Commission,166 and it further begs the question of whether
Short-selling introduces a new demarcation line in addition to that related to
the (non-)essential elements and the one distinguishing Articles 290 and 291
TFEU: should a distinction also be made between “general expertise” (in
which case the Commission is to be empowered) and “specific technical
and/or professional expertise” (in which case an agency may (or should?) be
empowered)? Again here, however, similar to Biocides, the legislature would
have almost unfettered discretion.167 Finally, it may be remarked that the Court
in Short-selling also sanctioned the creation of secondary legal bases, contrary
to its established case law.168
4.4.4. Post-Lisbon transitional problems of the third pillar: Visa
Information System and Europol
The problematic issue of secondary legal bases also figured in Visa
Information System and Europol, which were further complicated by the fact
that the Court had to rule on the validity of post-Lisbon measures adopted
pursuant to pre-Lisbon procedures in accordance with the transitional
provisions laid down in the Lisbon Treaty.
164. Ibid., para 86.
165. Ibid., para 82.
166. Ohler, “Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der Europäischen Wertpapier- und
Marktaufsichtsbehörde (ESMA)”, 69 JZ (2014), 249–252, at 251; Skowron,
“Kapitalmarktrecht: Rechtmäßigkeit der Eingriffsbefugnisse der ESMA nach Art. 28
Leerverkaufsverordnung”, 25 EuZW (2014), 349–355, at 353.
167. In favour of such a discretion, see Lenaerts, “EMU and the EU’s constitutional
framework”, 39 EL Rev. (2014), 753–769, at 763.
168. This issue was first dealt with in the Minimum Common Lists case, Case C-133/06,
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2008:257. For an extensive discussion, see Opinion of A.G.
Maduro in the case, EU:C:2007:551, paras. 23–36. However, that case dealt with a secondary
legal basis to adopt legislative measures. In Case C-540/13, Visa Information System (cf. infra),
the Court also expanded the prohibition to cover non-legislative measures.
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In both cases, the Parliament challenged a non-legislative act adopted by the
Council pursuant to a legal basis provided in a (pre-Lisbon) third pillar
legislative act. In this area, the Council could, following a proposal by the
Commission or a Member State, unanimously adopt legislative acts, having
consulted the Parliament.169 The measures implementing these legislative
acts could then be adopted by the Council using qualified majority voting
(QMV) and having consulted the Parliament.170 In Visa Information
System,171 Article 18(2) of the Council’s legislative act allowed it to decide on
the entry into force of the regulation on a future date172 which it did through
Decision 2013/392.173 In Europol (see also above), the Council had adopted a
list of third countries174 with which Europol could conclude agreements
pursuant to Article 26(1) of the Europol Decision, which provided that the
Council could adopt such an implementing measure by QMV and having
consulted the Parliament.175 In both cases the Parliament challenged the
Council’s non-legislative decisions and further incidentally challenged the
legality of the secondary legal bases provided for in the basic legislative acts.
In both cases the Court broadly followed the same approach, inter alia
ruling that Article 9 of Protocol No 36 on Transitional Provisions to the
Lisbon Treaty generally maintains the legal effects of pre-Lisbon acts in the
field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, thus including any
provisions in those acts which prescribe specific procedures for adopting
further measures.176 However, in Visa Information System, the Court did
confirm that the prohibition on the creation of secondary legal bases also
encompassed legal bases designed to adopt non-legislative acts.177 As noted,
this stands in contrast with the Court’s ruling in Short-selling, in which a
secondary legal basis empowering an agency to adopt de facto implementing
acts had been sanctioned.
In Visa Information System, then, the secondary legal basis provided for in
Article 18(2) of the Council’s (legislative) decision was saved by the Court
applying a doctrine of constitutional avoidance:178 although Article 18(2) did
not refer to a consultation of the Parliament, the provision had to be read in the
light of Article 39 of the (pre-Lisbon) EU Treaty, which did provide for such
169. See Art. 34(2) iuncto 39 of the (pre-Lisbon) EU Treaty.
170. See Art. 34(2)c iuncto 39 of the (pre-Lisbon) EU Treaty.
171. Case C-540/13, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2015:224.
172. See Art. 18(2) of Decision (JHA) 2008/633 of the Council, O.J. 2008, L 218/129.
173. Decision (EU) 2013/392 of the Council, O.J. 2013, L 198/45.
174. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2014/269, O.J. 2014, 138/104.
175. See Art. 26(1) of Decision (JHA) 2009/371 of the Council, O.J. 2009, L 121/37.
176. Case C-540/13, Parliament v. Council, paras. 42–5; Case C-363/14, Parliament v.
Council, paras. 69–70.
177. Case C-540/13, Parliament v. Council, para 33.
178. Ibid., para 38.
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a consultation. While not finding an illegality in the legislative decision itself,
the contested decision was still annulled because it had been adopted by the
Council without having consulted the Parliament. Ironically, the Council tried
to save its decision by invoking Article 291 TFEU which does not foresee a
consultation for the Parliament. According to the Council, imposing such a
requirement would then “jeopardize the institutional balance established by
the Treaty of Lisbon.”179 The Court rightly rejected this argument, noting that
Article 291 TFEU was irrelevant since the controversy in casu was not
governed by the new Lisbon Treaty rules in the first place.180
In Europol the Parliament principally argued that the list of third countries
touched on the essential elements (see discussion above) or that at “the very
least, it should be regarded as a normative element which must be the subject
of a delegated act within the meaning of Article 290 TFEU rather than an
implementing act within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU.”181 Of course, in
the light of Article 9 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, the Court was
unconvinced by this argument.182 Since the secondary legal basis in the
Europol Decision imposed the same procedure as provided for under
the (pre-Lisbon) EU Treaty, the Court in the end dismissed also this plea of the
Parliament.183
4.4.5. The Courts’ failure in upholding Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
It is clear from these cases that the Courts did not uphold Articles 290 and 291
TFEU, but did they also fail in doing so? It appears that these cases are quite
a mixed bag. In Visa Information System and Europol, the Court cannot be
faulted for not following the Parliament’s reasoning. As the Court found, the
Parliament’s interpretation of Article 9 of Protocol 36 would complicate or
even prevent the proper application of all pre-Lisbon legislation in the field of
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.184 While it is regrettable
that this may significantly postpone the full communautarisation of the
former third pillar, the Court cannot be faulted for a conscious choice of the
Treaty authors. Indeed, as Advocate General Wahl noted,185 Article 9 does not
provide for any time limit and therefore maintains the legal effects of
179. Ibid., para 52.
180. Ibid., para 58.
181. Case C-363/14, Parliament v. Council, para 33.
182. Ibid., para 71.
183. Ibid., para 73.
184. Case C-540/13, Parliament v. Council, para 45; see also the Joint Opinion of A.G.
Wahl to Joined Cases C-317 & 679/13 and Case C-540/13, Parliament v. Council,
EU:C:2015:35, paras. 42–51.
185. Ibid., para 44.
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pre-Lisbon secondary legislation until that legislation is amended or repealed.
The same political problem was at issue in Netherlands v. Commission, since
the Treaty authors did not opt for a solution which automatically replaces the
PRAC with a procedure to adopt delegated acts and did not lay down a
time-limit for updating the existing body of legislation to the new Lisbon
framework.186 As a result, the (pre-Lisbon) PRAC will continue to be relevant
(post-Lisbon), as long as each (pre-Lisbon) legislative act referring to the
procedure has not been amended or repealed. That this is taking longer than
initially expected has been noted elsewhere.187 Still, the General Court can be
faulted for its legally flawed reasoning resulting in Article 291 TFEU not
being fully upheld. A consequence of the Court’s ruling is that six years
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty new (non-legislative) acts
may still be adopted introducing the PRAC for further rule-making.
Even if upholding Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in Short-selling could have
been “foolish judicial disregard for the vital need to ensure continuing
financial stability within Europe”,188 the blank cheque given by the Court to
the legislature to “elaborate” the framework of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
actually undermines and potentially nullifies that framework.This criticism of
the Court may seem too harsh, since again it was confronted with the
(conscious) negligence of the Treaty authors: when the framework of Articles
290 and 291 TFEU was originally drafted, the Treaty authors were well aware
of the existence and growing importance of the EU agencies. Thus, already in
2004 the new Constitutional Treaty was outdated in respect of the
(implementing) acts adopted by the agencies.189 In all earnest, then, the Court
could not have come up with an elegant and legally sound solution; but the
Court may still be faulted for its remarkably blunt conclusion to the effect that
the Treaty framework is open and that no special requirements have to be met
before the legislature may empower an agency.
Finally, the Court’s ruling in Spain v. Parliament and Council is the most
open to criticism, even if here as well the Court will have been mindful of the
consequences of strictly upholding Article 291(2) TFEU. Since it took the
Member States more than 40 years to agree on a unitary patent, the Court
186. Sydow suggests that the Treaty authors may have mistakenly assumed that only the
regime under Art. 291 TFEU would require a horizontal instrument. See Sydow, op. cit. supra
note 125, at 162.
187. Chamon, op. cit. supra note 31, at 721–723.
188. Everson, “European agencies: Barely legal?”, in Everson, Monda and Vos (Eds.),
European Agencies in between Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law International,
2014), p. 50.
189. Criticizing this, see de Witte, op. cit. supra note 27, pp. 99–100;Vos, op. cit. supra note
96, at 230.
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might have thought it politically unwise to hinder a compromise a second
time,190 possibly dealing a fatal blow to the project.
5. The InterinstitutionalAgreement on Better Law-making and the
Common Understanding on DelegatedActs
As noted above, the actual reform brought by the Lisbon Treaty is determined
in a number of rounds, one of which is the adoption, by the institutions, of
infra-constitutional norms on Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. While Article
291(3) TFEU itself instructs the institutions to adopt such a binding norm,
Article 290 TFEU does not. Nevertheless, to ease the legislative process, the
institutions in 2011 also adopted a Common Understanding, on delegated
acts, recently replaced by the Common Understanding annexed to the
Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on Better Law-making.191 While the
Common Understanding would fulfil the same function as the Comitology
Regulation, its status as a genuine norm of infra-constitutional law is less
clear given the legal nature of interinstitutional agreements.192 Still, the IIA,
which is binding, includes a number of important commitments which the
institutions have entered into vis-à-vis each other, codifying both existing
practices and parts of the Courts’ case law as well as introducing new
arrangements.
In the IIA, the institutions confirm that it is up to the legislature “to decide
whether and to what extent to use delegated or implementing acts, within the
limits of the Treaties”. This provision may be read as codifying Biocides and
Visa reciprocity,193 but it may also confirm the legislature’s freedom to
exhaustively regulate a certain matter.194 Importantly, through the IIA, the
190. This following its Opinion 1/09 re the creation of a unified patent litigation system,
EU:C:2011:123.
191. IIA on Better Law-Making, O.J. 2016, L 123/1.
192. Art. 295 TFEU provides: “The European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission . . . may, in compliance with the Treaties, conclude interinstitutional agreements
which may be of a binding nature.” While the present IIA is binding, not all of the IIAs are and
some may be merely politically binding, see Driessen, Interinstitutional Convention as Checks
and Balances in EU Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2006), Phd Thesis, p. 72; Hummer,
“From ‘interinstitutional agreements’ to ‘interinstitutional agencies/offices’?”, 13 ELJ (2007),
47–74, at 57–65. Driessen finds that some of the IIAs in the EU are the “substantive equivalent
of national (organic) laws.” See Driessen, p. 70.
193. Reading the provision in this way, see Tovo, “I nuovi equilibri tra potere esecutivo e
legislativo nell’Unione europea: l’accordo interistituzionale “legiferare meglio””, 7 Apr. 2016,
available at: <rivista.eurojus.it>, p. 2.
194. Ibid. See also supra note 41.
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Commission commits to consult “all necessary expertise, including through
the consultation of Member States” experts’ before adopting delegated acts.
Further, the institutions have committed to adopt further (albeit non-binding)
criteria for the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. By the end of 2017
a register will also be set up “to enhance transparency, facilitate planning and
enable traceability of all the different stages in the lifecycle of a delegated act.”
This is to be lauded in light of one of the drawbacks of the Lisbon Treaty:
pre-Lisbon the comitology register and the yearly report covered all
comitology procedures, but since comitology has shrivelled to Article 291
TFEU acts, the delegated acts are not recorded any more.195 A register for
delegated acts will now re-introduce this transparency.
Crucially, and recognizing the infra-constitutional character of the
Comitology Regulation,196 the institutions agree that no further procedural
requirements altering the mechanisms for control foreseen in the Comitology
Regulation should be introduced. This raises the question whether the current
practice of the mandatory involvement of some of the decentralized agencies
(notably the European Supervisory Authorities) in the drafting of
implementing acts is in line with the IIA.197 The Common Understanding
(CU) on delegated acts essentially takes over the 2011 CU, elaborating only
the section on “consultations in the preparation and drawing up of delegated
acts”. However, the additions to the new CU are significant: whereas the old
CU instructed the Commission to generally consult experts, the new CU
clarifies that the Commission is obliged to consultMember States’ experts198
and the Council and Parliament may now also send their own experts to these
meetings.199 Further, the Commission is obliged to make clear what
conclusions it has drawn from the Member States’ experts’ input and how it
will take this input into account.200 Where a draft delegated act is reworked, the
Commission is further obliged to send the new draft back to the experts for
comments.201 Finally, the Commission will have to make “indicative lists of
planned delegated acts . . . at regular intervals.”202 Here the Commission has
195. Noting this, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note 34, at 67.
196. If the comitology regulation would form part of the body of ordinary secondary
legislation any other legislative act could introduce ad hoc comitology procedures, deviating
from those set out in the comitology regulation.
197. The procedural requirements imposed on the Commission by the ESA Regulations
constrain the Commission to such a degree that assistance seems ill-fitting to describe the
ESAs’ role.
198. See point 4 of the Common Understanding.
199. Ibid., point 11.
200. Ibid., point 5.
201. Ibid., point 7.
202. Ibid., point 9.
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failed to safeguard its “large measure of autonomy” which it (rightly) claimed
in its 2009 Communication.203
The new CU thus greatly strengthens the role of the Member States in the
adoption of delegated acts. Even if this is merely a codification of existing
practices, it is significant because it de facto (re-)introduces comitology to
Article 290 TFEU. Indeed, the requirements imposed on the Commission by
the CU result in a procedure resembling the comitology advisory
procedure.204 On this, Tovo rightly concludes that this “weak” comitology
procedure allows the Member States to intrude on the EU’s legislative
function, which does not make sense from a constitutional point of view.205
Again part of the Lisbon Treaty’s reform is being undone, even if the Member
States’ involvement can also be seen as a form of assistance (rather than
control) and even if the arrangement laid down in the CU is indeed a weak
form of comitology compared to the pre-Lisbon procedures.
The institutions’ commitment in the IIA to lay down further criteria
distinguishing Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (see above) seems much like an
empty box, since the Court already confirmed that the legislature has full
discretion in this (within the limits set by the Treaties). As a result, there is no
reason for the legislature (especially the Council) to work out any criteria,
which explains why the IIA already foretells that they will be non-binding.206
6. Conclusion
Combining the Courts’ case law and the political institutions’ Common
Understanding, it is possible to properly assess the Lisbon Treaty’s reform
through Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. While on paper the institutional balance
had been significantly redefined, the Court has curtailed the reform by
reading a different institutional balance into Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, and
the institutions have partially aligned their practice to the pre-Lisbon
institutional balance. As a result, seven years following the entry into force of
the LisbonTreaty, the original positive reception of its reform throughArticles
203. The Commission found that since Art. 290 TFEU was silent on the “procedure by
which the Commission adopts a delegated act, . . . the Commission enjoys a large measure of
autonomy in this matter.” See COM(2009)673, at 6.
204. The two procedures are not identical however. For instance, Art. 3(4) of the
Comitology Regulation provides inter alia that the Commission “shall endeavour to find
solutions which command the widest possible support within the committee” but such an
obligation is not imposed by the CU.
205. See Tovo, op. cit. supra note 193, p. 3.
206. As a result, Tovo believes the future criteria will be an unnecessary duplication of the
criteria listed in Parliament’s 2014 resolution. See Tovo, op. cit. supra note 193, p. 2.
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290 and 291 TFEU will have reversed in a certain disillusionment. While
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU could never have constituted the sole framework
for executive rule-making, given the sui generis implementing powers of the
Council (and Commission), the Court also failed to uphold the new
framework.
The post-Lisbon institutional balance is not a break with the past; instead it
is (merely) the latest stage in the continuous development of comitology. In
this regard, the following issues are critical: firstly, the distinction between
legislative and non-legislative acts, introduced by the Court in Köster and
codified by the Lisbon Treaty, is a demarcation line that is effectively enforced
by the Court. This is different from the distinction between delegated and
implementing acts, which the Court has left to the discretion of the legislature.
The Court’s differentiated approach is puzzling. Does the Court only enforce
the former because it originally introduced it itself? While its rulings in
Biocides and Visa reciprocity may be seen as a continuation of its traditional
comitology case law, this sits uneasily with its ruling in Connecting Europe
Facility where it did go beyond the letter of Article 290 TFEU, expanding the
non-delegation doctrine. One way to make sense of these cases is to see them
as the Court restricting itself to enforcing the primacy of the legislature (see
also SBC, Europol and Multi-annual cod plan). Insofar as this primacy is
safeguarded, the Court then largely resigns itself to institutional practice
without totally relinquishing its prerogative to scrutinize the political
institutions’ acts. The result is an institutional balance that is largely
favourable to the legislature, but which does not conform to the institutional
balance enshrined in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU since it does not safeguard
the Commission’s prerogatives. Here the Court’s post-Lisbon case law stands
in stark contrast with its post-Lisbon case law in the area of external relations,
where it has ruled many cases in favour of the Commission.
While some of the other cases decided by the Courts were criticized as well,
they do not amount to instances of constitutional denial. Unavoidably, it takes
some time before the General Court has aligned its case law to that of the ECJ
(Czech Republic v. Commission and Connecting Europe Facility) and its
ruling in Netherlands v. Commission may be deplored since it effectively
undermines Article 291 TFEU, but is also the result of the Council’s
unwillingness to fully align all pre-Lisbon legislation to Articles 290 and 291
TFEU. Similarly, it should be hoped that the Court’s dubious finding on the
need for uniform conditions in Spain v. Parliament and Council is a
by-product of this very special case and will not set a precedent. Likewise in
Short-selling the Court ruled unsatisfactorily, but it should not be forgotten
that it was confronted with a problem which the primary legislature should
(and could) have addressed in several IGCs. Similarly, the issues in
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Netherlands v. Commission, Visa Information System and Europol resulted
inter alia from the Treaty authors’ omission to work out more detailed
transitional arrangements. This further links up with the critique on the recent
Common Understanding on delegated acts, in which the political institutions
themselves have codified a form of comitology, disregarding the institutional
balance resulting from Article 290 TFEU.
What does all this mean for the Community method? While the new
institutional balance (on paper) marked a shift thereto, the institutional
balance as it follows from the Court’s jurisprudence is not a radical break with
the past. As a result, the move towards the Community method is not fully
pushed through. It was noted above that the Community method was visible in
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU because these Articles map out the roles to be
played by the different institutions (and Member States) in function of the
actual interests at stake; because the supranational institutions were
strengthened; and because the legal framework in primary law was elaborated,
allowing the Court to further subject the political sphere to abstract legal
principles. The sections above show how both the political institutions and the
Court have detracted from this. By allowing the legislature a discretionary
choice between Article 290 and 291 TFEU, the fundamental distinction
between the two is undermined. By resigning itself to institutional practice,
the Court has missed opportunities to structure the political process; and by
agreeing to re-introduce comitology to Article 290 TFEU, the institutions
have ignored the fact that the Member States (as such) should not be involved
in Article 290 TFEU procedures.
The recent IIA on Better Law-making and the Common Understanding on
delegated acts indeed show how also the political institutions may prefer
continuity to change, since one of the novelties under Article 290 TFEU, i.e.
the absence of a comitology procedure, has been effectively undone. The
result is similar to the Single European Act’s changes to the comitology
system (although the SEA’s changes were not even revolutionary on paper):
an incremental change of the institutional balance. The actual institutional
balance in this area is then still a long way off from the Community method,
even if Articles 290 and 291 TFEU held unseen potential to introduce it also
in the area of executive rule-making.
In light of both the express provisions and the objectives of the Lisbon
Treaty these political and jurisprudential developments should be deplored,
but it may be vain hope to think that the institutions will reconsider the chosen
path. The Lisbon Treaty has not realized its revolutionary potential and
instead has proven to be one of the many evolutionary changes for the
normative framework governing the implementation of EU law.
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